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This paper is a survey of the literature on boards of directors, with
an emphasis on research done subsequent to the Hermalin and Weis-
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cess and the effect of board composition on board actions and firm
performance.
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1 Introduction
People often question whether corporate boards matter because their day-to-
day impact is difficult to observe. But when things go wrong, they can become
the center of attention. Certainly this was true of the Enron, Worldcom, and
Parmalat scandals. The directors of Enron and Worldcom, in particular, were
held liable for the fraud that occurred: Enron directors had to pay $168 million
to investor plaintiffs, of which $13 million was out of pocket (not covered by
insurance); and Worldcom directors had to pay $36 million, of which $18 million
was out of pocket.1 As a consequence of these scandals and ongoing concerns
about corporate governance, boards have been at the center of the policy debate
concerning governance reform and the focus of considerable academic research.
Because of this renewed interest in boards, a review of what we have and have
not learned from research on corporate boards is timely.
Much of the research on boards ultimately touches on the question “what is
the role of the board?” Possible answers range from boards’ being simply legal
necessities, something akin to the wearing of wigs in English courts, to their
playing an active part in the overall management and control of the corpora-
tion. No doubt the truth lies somewhere between these extremes; indeed, there
are probably multiple truths when this question is asked of different firms, in
different countries, or in different periods.
Given that all corporations have boards, the question of whether boards
play a role cannot be answered econometrically as there is no variation in the
explanatory variable. Instead, studies look at differences across boards and ask
whether these differences explain differences in the way firms function and how
they perform. The board differences that one would most like to capture are
differences in behavior. Unfortunately, outside of detailed field work, it is dif-
ficult to observe differences in behavior and harder still to quantify them in
a way useful for statistical study. Consequently, empirical work in this area
has focused on structural differences across boards that are presumed to corre-
late with differences in behavior. For instance, a common presumption is that
outside (non-management) directors will behave differently than inside (man-
agement) directors. One can then look at the conduct of boards (e.g., decision
to dismiss the ceo when financial performance is poor) with different ratios
of outside to inside directors to see whether conduct varies in a statistically
significant manner across different ratios. When conduct is not directly observ-
able (e.g., advice to the ceo about strategy), one can look at a firm’s financial
performance to see whether board structure matters (e.g., the way accounting
profits vary with the ratio of outside to inside directors).
One problem confronting such an empirical approach is that there is no rea-
son to suppose board structure is exogenous; indeed, there are both theoretical
arguments and empirical evidence to suggest board structure is endogenous (see,
e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988, 1998, and 2003). This endogeneity creates
estimation problems if governance choices are made on the basis of unobserv-
1Klausner et al. (2005).
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ables correlated with the error term in the regression equations being estimated.
In fact, one of our main points in this survey is the importance of endogeneity.
Governance structures arise endogenously because economic actors choose them
in response to the governance issues they face.2
Beyond the implications endogeneity holds for econometric analysis, it also
has implications for how to view actual governance practice. In particular,
when we observe what appears to be a poor governance structure, we need to
ask why that structure was chosen. Although it is possible that the governance
structure was chosen by mistake, one needs to give at least some weight to the
possibility that it represents the right, albeit poor, solution to the constrained
optimization problem the organization faces. After all, competition in factor,
capital, and product markets should lead, in Darwinian fashion, to the survival
of the fittest. While admittedly “fittest” does not mean “optimal,” anything
that was sub-optimal for known reasons would be unfit insofar as there would
be pressure to address these reasons for sub-optimality. In other words, existing
sub-optimality is unlikely to lend itself to quick or obvious fixes.
This insight about endogeneity is, however, easy to forget in the face of data.
Figure 1 shows a plot of two data points.3 On the horizontal axis is an attribute
of governance (e.g., board size). On the vertical axis is a measure of financial
performance. One firm has more of the attribute, but weaker performance; while
the other firm has less of the attribute, but better performance. A regression line
through the points underscores the apparent negative relation between attribute
and performance. Without further analysis, one might be tempted to conclude
that a firm would do better if it shrank the size of its board. The problem with
such a conclusion is that it fails to consider why a large board might have been
chosen in the first place.
Figure 2 replicates Figure 1, but it also shows the optimization problems
faced by the two firms in question. Observe that, for a given firm, there is
a non-monotonic relation between the attribute and financial performance. In
particular, the relation is concave and admits an interior maximum. Moreover,
each of the two firms is at its maximum. Consequently, whereas Firm 2 would
prefer ceteris paribus to be on Firm 1’s curve, it isn’t and, thus, would do worse
than it is doing if it were to shrink its board in line with the na¨ıve conclusion
drawn from the regression in Figure 1.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate another issue confronting the study of governance,
namely heterogeneity in the solutions firms choose for their governance prob-
lems.4 As illustrated, Firms 1 and 2 face different governance problems and, not
2Demsetz and Lehn (1985) were among the first to make the general point that governance
structures are endogenous. Others who have raised it include Himmelberg et al. (1999), Palia
(2001), and Coles et al. (2007). The point has also been discussed in various surveys of the
literature; consider, e.g., Bhagat and Jefferis (2002) and Becht et al. (2003), among others.
3Figure 1 is presented for illustrative purposes and should not be read as a critique of any
existing research. In particular, none of the studies discussed below are as na¨ıve as Figure 1.
4To be sure, a real empirical study would attempt, in part, to control for such heterogeneity
by putting in other controls, including if the data permitted, firm fixed effects. It should be
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surprisingly, are driven to different solutions. Almost every model of governance
shows that the equilibrium outcome is sensitive to its exogenous parameters;
consequently, heterogeneity in those parameters will lead to heterogeneity in so-
lutions. Moreover, once one takes into account various sources of non-convexity,
such as those arising in optimal incentive schemes, one may find that strategic
considerations lead otherwise identical firms to adopt different governance solu-
tions (see, e.g., Hermalin, 1994).
Some help with the heterogeneity issue could be forthcoming from more
theoretical analyses. Although a common—and not necessarily inaccurate—
perception of the literature on corporate governance, particularly related to
boards of directors, is that it is largely empirical, such a view overlooks a large
body of general theory that is readily applied to the specific topic of boards. For
instance, monitoring by the board would seem to fit into the general literature
on hierarchies and supervision (e.g., Williamson, 1975, Calvo and Wellisz, 1979,
Kofman and Lawarre´e, 1993, and Tirole, 1986, 1992). As a second example,
issues of board collaboration would seem to fit into the general literature on
free-riding and the teams problem (see, e.g., Holmstrom, 1982).
The teams-problem example serves to illustrate a problem that can arise in
applying “off-the-shelf” theory to boards. It is well known that, as a member’s
share of a team’s output falls, he or she supplies less effort. For boards, however,
the question is not a single director’s effort, but what happens to total effort
(e.g., are larger boards less capable monitors because of the teams problem)?
Yet, here, theory cannot provide a definitive answer—whether total equilibrium
effort increases or not with board size depends critically on assumptions about
functional forms.5 While “anything goes” conclusions can be acceptable in
an abstract theoretical model, they are often less than satisfactory in applied
modeling. The lack of clear definitive predictions in much of the related general
theory is, therefore, a hindrance to modeling governance issues. Conversely, if a
specific model makes a definitive prediction, then one can often be left wondering
if it is an artifact of particular assumptions rather than a reflection of a robust
economic truth.
A second, related point is that, in a simplified, and thus tractable, model,
theory can be too strong; that is, by application of sophisticated contracts or
mechanisms, the parties (e.g., directors and ceo) can achieve a more optimal
outcome than reality indicates is possible. To an extent, that problem can be
finessed; for instance, if one restricts attention to incomplete contracts. But as
noted, however, that (i) there can still be a problem with the specification if the attribute enters
into the specification only linearly (as opposed to nonlinearly as suggested by the parabolas
in Figure 2); and (ii) if different firms face different shaped tradeoffs (e.g., if the parabolas
aren’t the same shape for all firms), then the coefficients on the attribute, its square, etc., will
vary across firms, suggesting a random-coefficients approach is warranted. See Hermalin and
Wallace (2001) and Bhagat and Jefferis (2002) for a discussion of some of these methodological
issues.
5For instance, if a team’s total benefit is
PN
n=1 en, where en is the effort of agent n, each
agent gets 1/N of the benefit, and each agent n’s utility is
`PN
m=1 em
´
/N − (eγ+1n )/(γ + 1),
then total equilibrium effort is N
`
1
N
´1/γ
, which is increasing in N if γ > 1, decreasing in N
if γ ∈ (0, 1), and constant if γ = 1.
4
others have noted, the assumption of incomplete contracts can fail to be robust
to minor perturbations of the information structure (Hermalin and Katz, 1991)
or the introduction of a broader class of mechanisms (Maskin and Tirole, 1999).
A further issue is that corporations are complex, yet, to have any traction,
a model must abstract away from many features of real-life corporations. This
makes it difficult to understand the complex and multifaceted solutions firms
use to solve their governance problems. For instance, the optimal governance
structure might involve a certain type of board, operating in a certain fashion,
having implemented a particular incentive package, and responding in certain
ways to feedback from the relevant product and capital markets. To include
all those features in a model is infeasible, but can we expect the assumption of
ceteris paribus with respect to the non-modeled aspects of the situation to be
reasonable? The constrained answer arrived at by holding all else constant need
not represent the unconstrained answer accurately.
Yet another point, related both to the previous point and to our emphasis
on issues of endogeneity, is that, motivated by both a desire to simplify and to
conform to institutional details, the modeler is often tempted to take certain
aspects of the governance structure as given. The problem with this is that the
governance structure is largely endogenous ; it is, in its entirety, the solution
reached by economic actors to their governance problems. Of course, certain
features, such as the necessity of having a board of directors, can largely be
seen as exogenous (although it should be remembered that the decision to make
a company a corporation rather than, say, a partnership is itself endogenous).
Furthermore, the timing of events, particularly in the short run, can make it
reasonable to treat some aspects of the governance structure as exogenous for
the purposes of investigating certain questions theoretically.
In this survey, we focus primarily on work that illustrates the sorts of chal-
lenges discussed above, papers that help clarify the nature of board behavior,
or that use novel approaches. We also attempt to put the work under the same
conceptual microscope, namely how should the results be interpreted in light of
governance structures being the second-best solution to the governance problems
faced by the firm. Our focus is also on more recent papers, even if they are not
yet published, because prior surveys by John and Senbet (1998) and Hermalin
and Weisbach (2003) cover many established papers in this field. Although we
aim to be comprehensive, it would be impossible to discuss every paper in light
of the recent explosion in the literature on boards.6 Of necessity, we omit many
interesting papers in this area and we apologize to their authors in advance.
For a more detailed discussion of the event-study evidence surrounding board
appointments, we refer the reader to Yermack (2006). Fields and Keys (2003)
review the monitoring role of the board, as well as the emerging literature on
board diversity (see, also, Carter et al., 2003, Farrell and Hersch, 2005, and
Adams and Ferreira, in press, on board diversity). We do not directly discuss
director turnover, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) review some of the relevant
6After searching the literature, we estimate that more than 200 working papers on boards
were written in the first five years since Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) published their board
survey (no causal link is implied).
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literature on this topic.7 For the sake of brevity, we do not discuss the liter-
ature on boards of financial institutions. Because this is a survey of corporate
boards, we also do not discuss the literature on boards of organizations such as
non-profits and central banks. Partly because of the difficulty in obtaining data,
this literature is less developed than the literature on corporate boards (Bowen,
1994, discusses some of the similarities and differences between corporate and
non-corporate boards).8 Similar data limitations restrict us to a discussion of
boards of publicly traded corporations. Finally, we do not consider studies that
compare governance internationally.
Although this survey primarily considers the economics and finance liter-
atures, boards are a subject of interest in many other disciplines, including
accounting, law, management, psychology, and sociology.9 While there is an
overlap in these literatures, there are also differences. For instance, the eco-
nomics and finance literature’s focus has traditionally been on the agency prob-
lems boards solve or, in some instances, create. In contrast, the sociological
and management literatures also emphasize that boards can (i) play a role in
strategy setting and (ii) provide critical resources to the firm, such as building
networks and connections (see e.g., Finkelstein et al., 2009). Some of the topics
previously in the domain of other disciplines are beginning to be of interest in
the economics and finance literature. For example, this literature has begun to
incorporate issues of expertise, trust, diversity, power, and networks into their
analyses.10
The next section considers the question of what directors do. The section
following, Section 3, considers issues related to board structure. Section 4 dis-
cusses how boards fulfill their roles. Section 5 examines the literature on what
motivates directors. We end with some concluding remarks.
2 What Do Directors Do?
To understand corporate boards, one should begin with the question of what
do directors do?11
7See also Fich and Shivdasani (2007), Perry and Shivdasani (2005), and Yermack (2004),
for some recent work in this area.
8Also see Hermalin (2004) for a discussion of how research on corporate boards may inform
the study of university and college boards. Freedman (2004) discusses the relation between
universities and colleges’ boards and their presidents.
9Some examples of this broader literature include Bebchuk and Fried (2004), Demb and
Neubauer (1992), Grandori, ed (2004), Hambrick et al. (1996), Lorsch and MacIver (1989),
Mace (1971), Pfeffer (1972), Roe (1994), Westphal and Zajac (1995), Westphal (1999), and
Zajac and Westphal (1996).
10For research from an economic perspective on director diversity, see Carter et al. (2003),
Farrell and Hersch (2005), and Adams and Ferreira (in press). Director expertise is discussed
infra in Section 2.3. Some aspects of power related to boards are captured in Hermalin
and Weisbach (1998); see Rajan and Zingales (1998) for a more general economic analysis of
power in organizations. See Khwaja et al. (2008) for work on the value to a firm created by
its directors’ social networks.
11This question is distinct from the question of what should directors do? This second
question is answered, in part, by the legal obligations imposed by corporate law (both statute
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2.1 Descriptive Studies
One way to determine what directors do is to observe directors; that is, do
field work. There is a large descriptive literature on boards (e.g., Mace, 1971,
Whisler, 1984, Lorsch and MacIver, 1989, Demb and Neubauer, 1992, and
Bowen, 1994).
The principal conclusions of Mace were that “directors serve as a source
of advice and counsel, serve as some sort of discipline, and act in crisis situ-
ations” if a change in ceo becomes necessary (p. 178). The nature of their
“advice and counsel” is unclear. Mace suggests that a board serves largely as
a sounding board for the ceo and top management, occasionally providing ex-
pertise when a firm faces an issue about which one or more board members
are expert. Yet Demb and Neubauer’s survey results find that approximately
two-thirds of directors agreed that “setting the strategic direction of the com-
pany” was one of the jobs they did (p. 43, emphasis added).12 Eighty percent
of the directors also agreed that they were “involved in setting strategy for the
company” (p. 43). Seventy-five percent of respondents to another of Demb and
Neubauer’s questionnaires report that they “set strategy, corporate policies,
overall direction, mission, vision” (p. 44). Indeed far more respondents agreed
with that description of their job than agreed with the statements that their job
entailed “oversee[ing], monitor[ing] top management, ceo” (45%); “succession,
hiring/firing ceo and top management” (26%); or serving as a “watchdog for
shareholders, dividends” (23%).
The disciplinary role of boards is also unclear from descriptive studies. Per-
haps reflecting the period he studied, Mace suggests that discipline stems largely
from the ceo and other top management knowing “that periodically they must
appear before a board made up largely of their peers” (p. 180). Lorsch and
MacIver take an even dimmer view, suggesting that boards are so passive that
they offer little by way of discipline (see, especially, p. 96). Demb and Neubauer’s
statistics seem broadly consistent with this view, as less than half of their re-
spondents agree that their job is to “oversee, monitor top management, ceo”
and less than a quarter agree that their job is to serve as a “watchdog for
shareholders, dividends” (p. 44).
On the other hand, it has been suggested that the board passivity described
by Mace and Lorsch and MacIver is a phenomenon of the past. For instance,
MacAvoy and Millstein (1999) suggest that boards have recently become less
passive; that is, they have evolved from being “managerial rubber-stamps to
active and independent monitors.” MacAvoy and Millstein provide statistical
evidence in support of that conclusion, finding that CalPERS’ grading of a
firm’s board procedures is positively correlated with accounting-based measures
of performance. Another piece of evidence consistent with the view that boards
and precedent), having to do with fiduciary obligations (see, e.g., Clark, 1986, especially
chapters 3 and 4).
12It is important to note that the Demb and Neubauer surveys and questionnaires sample
very few American directors (4.2%). The top four nationalities surveyed by them are British
(29.6%), German (11.3%), French (11.3%), and Canadian (9.9%). Overall 43.7% of their
respondents come from common-law countries.
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have become tougher is that ceo dismissal probabilities have been trending
upward (see Huson et al., 2001, for evidence over the period 1971 to 1994 and
see Kaplan and Minton, 2006, for more recent evidence).
2.2 The Hiring, Firing, and Assessment of Management
One role that is typically ascribed to directors is control of the process by which
top executives are hired, promoted, assessed, and, if necessary, dismissed (see,
e.g., Vancil, 1987, for a descriptive analysis and Naveen, 2006, for statistical
evidence).
Assessment can be seen as having two components, one is monitoring of
what top management does and the other is determining the intrinsic ability of
top management. The monitoring of managerial actions can, in part, be seen
as part of a board’s obligation to be vigilant against managerial malfeasance.
Yet, being realistic, it is difficult to see a board actually being in a position to
detect managerial malfeasance directly; at best, a board would seem dependent
on the actions of outside auditors, regulators, and, in some instances, the news
media. Indirectly, a board might guard against managerial malfeasance through
its choice of auditor, its oversight over reporting requirements, and its control
over accounting practices.
The principal focus of the literature on assessment, at least at a theoretical
level, has been on the question of how the board determines managerial abil-
ity and what it does with that information.13 One strategy for studying the
question of ability assessment has been the adaptation of Holmstrom’s (1999)
model, which analyzes agency and monitoring when agents have career concerns,
to boards. Within that approach, authors have focussed on how the assessment
of ability relates to the power of the ceo (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998);
to the selection of projects and strategy (e.g., Dominguez-Martinez et al., in
press); to the process of selecting the ceo (e.g., Hermalin, 2005); among other
issues.
2.2.1 Assessment, Bargaining Power, and CEO Control
The first article to apply Holmstrom’s framework to boards was Hermalin and
Weisbach (1998). In their model, there is an initial period of firm performance
under an incumbent ceo. Based on this performance, the board updates its
beliefs about the ceo’s ability. In light of these updated beliefs, the board may
choose to dismiss the ceo and hire a replacement from the pool of replacement
ceos or it may bargain with the incumbent ceo with regard to changes in
board composition and his future salary. The board, then, chooses whether to
obtain an additional, costly signal about ceo ability (either that of the original
incumbent if retained or the replacement if hired).14 Based on this signal,
13Typically, the ceo is a member of the board. In stating the ceo is at odds with “the
board,” we are, like the literature, using the board as shorthand for the board minus the ceo.
14An alternative, but essentially equivalent, modeling strategy for this stage would be to
assume the board always receives the additional signal, but the board has discretion over the
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if obtained, the board again makes a decision about keeping or replacing the
ceo. If replaced, a (another) ceo is drawn from the pool of replacement ceos.
Finally, second- (and final-) period profits are realized, with the expected value
of the profits being a positive function of the then-in-charge ceo’s ability.
The board’s inclination to obtain an additional signal is a function of its inde-
pendence from the ceo.15 The board’s independence at that stage will depend
on the outcome of the bargaining game between the board and the incumbent
ceo if he is retained.16 Because the acquisition of the additional signal can only
increase the risk of being dismissed and the ceo enjoys a non-contractible con-
trol benefit, the ceo prefers a less independent board; that is, a board less likely
to acquire this additional signal. The board, however, prefers to maintain its
independence. When the ceo has bargaining power—specifically when he has
demonstrated that he’s a “rare commodity” by performing well—the board’s
independence declines. Intuitively, a ceo who has shown himself to be above
average bargains on two dimensions: he can bargain for more compensation and,
because he prefers to remain ceo rather than be fired, the degree of the board’s
independence. At any moment in time, given its marginal rate of substitution
between firm performance and disutility of monitoring, a board views itself as
optimally independent (i.e., the directors view any change in their composition
that may lead to more or less diligence in monitoring as moving it away from
the incumbent board’s optimum).17 Hence, a local change in independence rep-
resents a second-order loss for the board (the top of the hill is essentially flat),
whereas as an increase in the ceo’s salary is a first-order loss (the marginal cost
of a dollar is always a dollar). The board, therefore, is more willing to budge on
the issue of independence (willingness to monitor) than salary, at least initially;
hence, there is movement on independence. So a ceo who performs well ends
up facing a less independent board. The flip side is that a ceo who performs
poorly is vulnerable to replacement.
Baker and Gompers (2003), Boone et al. (2007), and Ryan and Wiggins
(2004) each find evidence consistent with the idea that successful ceos are
able to bargain for less independent boards. Boone et al. find that variables
informativeness of the signal, with more informative signals being costlier to the board than
less informative signals. See the discussion in Hermalin (2005) on this matter.
15Independence is a complex concept. With respect to monitoring the ceo, one imagines
that directors who have close ties to the ceo (e.g., professionally, socially, or because the
ceo has power over them) would find monitoring him more costly than directors with fewer
ties (although see Westphal, 1999, for an opposing view). We discuss independence at length
infra.
16Hermalin and Weisbach assume there is sufficient competition among potential replace-
ment ceos for the position that a replacement ceo has no bargaining power. Their model
would be robust to giving a replacement ceo some bargaining power as long as it was less
than that enjoyed by an incumbent ceo who is retained.
17For instance, if the board’s actions are determined by a median-voter model, then the
incumbent median director (voter) knows that monitoring will be optimal from her perspective
if there is no change in board composition. If, however, composition changes so that she is
no longer the median director, then the level of monitoring will no longer be optimal from
her perspective. Provided, though, that the tastes of the new median director range on a
continuum from the incumbent median director’s, then having a new median director with only
slightly different tastes than the incumbent represents a second-order loss for the incumbent.
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that are reasonably associated with bargaining power either for the board or
the ceo are significant and have the right sign. In particular, measures of ceo
bargaining power, tenure, and the ceo’s shareholdings, are negatively correlated
with board independence. The tenure findings, in particular, are precisely what
the Hermalin and Weisbach model predicts. Measures that indicate that the
ceo has relatively less bargaining power, including outside director ownership
and the reputation of the firm’s investment banker at the time of its ipo, are all
positively correlated with board independence. Similarly, Baker and Gompers
find that measures that reflect the ceo’s bargaining power, including an estimate
of the ceo’s Shapley value and the reputation of the firm’s venture capitalists,
have the predicted signs (negative for the former and positive for the latter) with
respect to the percentage of non-inside directors on the board. At odds with the
Hermalin and Weisbach model and unlike Boone et al., Baker and Gompers find
a positive—albeit statistically insignificant—relationship between ceo tenure
and percentage of non-inside directors. Finally, Ryan and Wiggins find that
a ceo’s pay becomes less linked to equity performance as his control over the
board increases (proxied by his tenure and the proportion of insiders). These
authors interpret these findings as consistent with the Hermalin and Weisbach
bargaining framework, because it suggests that as ceos become more powerful,
they use this power to improve their well-being (e.g., as here, where this power
allows them to reduce the volatility of their compensation).
Baker and Gompers, Boone et al., and Ryan and Wiggins are all sensitive
to the issue that governance structures are endogenous. Baker and Gompers, in
particular, provide a convincing solution to the problem by identifying plausible
instruments for the endogeneous variable in their specification, venture capital
financing, these instruments being the state of operation and a time dummy
that captures exogenous capital inflows to venture capital funds. Yet none of
these papers sheds light on whether successful ceos are able to bargain for a
less independent board within the same firm, because they all rely on analyses
of repeated cross-sections of data rather than panel data with firm fixed-effects.
Shedding more direct empirical light on the dynamic nature of the ceo-board
relationship within firms remains an interesting topic for future research.
2.2.2 Assessment and Project Selection
Dominguez-Martinez et al. (in press) is a model similar to Hermalin and Weis-
bach (1998). A key difference between the two is that, in Dominguez-Martinez
et al., it is the ceo who determines what information the board learns. An in-
terpretation of Dominguez-Martinez et al.’s model is that there are two possible
types of ceo, good and bad. In each of two productive periods, a ceo draws
a project at random from a distribution of different projects (conditional on
ceo ability, each period’s draw is an independent event). Think of each project
being summarized by its npv. The difference between the two types of ceos is
that the distribution of projects (distribution of npvs to be precise) is better for
the good type than the bad type (e.g., the good type’s distribution dominates
the bad type’s in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance).
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The ceo sees the npv “stamped” on the project he draws, whereas the
board does not. In the second (final) period, the ceo’s incentives are such that
he implements the project he draws if and only if it has a positive npv. In the
first period, however, the ceo’s incentives are possibly misaligned with that of
the shareholders: The ceo values keeping his job. If his first-period actions or
performance lead the directors to infer he is the bad type and the board is not
committed to retain him, then he will be dismissed as it is better to draw again
from the pool of ceos than to continue to the second period with a ceo who is
known to be bad. The ceo’s concern about retaining his job makes it tempting,
therefore, for him to avoid risk to his reputation by not pursuing even positive
npv projects in the first period.
One potential solution would be for the board to commit to retain the first-
period ceo for the second period. With that commitment, ceos would choose
only positive npv projects in the first period. This, however, is not necessarily
optimal because the directors are throwing away the option to replace the ceo
if they infer he is likely to be bad. That is, as is also noted in Hermalin and
Weisbach, the ability to replace a ceo a board infers is probably bad creates a
valuable real option for the firm.
Given that good-type ceos are more likely to have positive npv projects
than bad types, an alternative strategy for the board would be to commit to
dismiss the ceo only if he doesn’t undertake a project. This, however, is not
without cost because now a ceo could be willing to undertake a negative npv
project if it is not so bad that the disutility resulting from pursing the project
outweighs his utility from retaining his job.18 Under this governance rule, some
number of negative npv projects will be pursued.
A third strategy might be for the board to commit to keep the ceo only if
he undertakes a positive npv project. This might seem optimal, insofar as it
avoids negative npv projects and allows some learning, but could nevertheless
be sub-optimal: How much is learned about the ceo’s ability depends on the
relative likelihood of the two types having projects with a particular npv. It
is possible, therefore, that if a given npv is more likely from a good type than
a bad type, then it could be worth having that project undertaken even if the
npv is negative because seeing the project provides valuable information about
the ceo’s ability. Conversely, if a given npv is more likely from a bad type
than a good type, then it could be worthwhile dismissing the ceo following the
realization of the project even if its npv is positive. Figure 3 illustrates. Purely
from the perspective of optimal inference, the board should retain a ceo if he
has a project with an npv above vi and dismiss him otherwise. If, however
vi < 0 = v0, then this cutoff implies first-period costs. Trading off these first-
period costs against the value of information, the board may wish to set a cutoff,
vc, between vi and v0; that is, a ceo keeps his job if and only if he undertakes
a project and that project pays off at least vc.
18Dominguez-Martinez et al. assume a ceo’s first-period utility function is pi + λχ, where
pi is the returns from the first-period project, λ > 0 is his benefit of keeping his job, and
χ ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether he loses or keeps his job, respectively.
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Figure 3: Illustration of the Dominguez-Martinez et al. (in press) model. The
probability density functions over NPV are shown for the two types.
From an informational perspective, the CEO should be retained if and
only if the realized value of a project is above vi. If, however, v0 denotes
the project with an NPV = 0, then the board, to limit first-period loses,
may wish to commit to retain the CEO if and only if realized value is
above some cutoff strictly between vi and v0.
Dominguez-Martinez et al. observe that their model offers a possible expla-
nation for why evidence of “poor decision making” does not always lead to ceo
dismissal. Sometimes it is optimal to let a ceo pursue a bad strategy rather
than stick to the status quo (i.e., better to pursue a negative npv project rather
than do nothing) because the information revealed from that course of action
allows the board to update positively about the ceo’s ability. Admittedly, as
formulated here, the same model would also explain the dismissal of a ceo after
moderate success if moderate success is more associated with low ability than
high ability.19 Dominguez-Martinez et al.’s model also suggests an explanation
for why new ceos rarely seem to be riding with training wheels when it comes
to managing their companies. Limiting a ceo’s range of action, while perhaps
a way to avoid risky mistakes, also limits how much the board can learn about
his ability. Especially early in his career, when relatively little is known, the
expected value of information can outweigh the expected cost of mistakes.
2.2.3 Assessment and CEO Selection
Hermalin (2005) is concerned with the fact that information is more valuable
when a board is seeking to infer the ability of a relatively unknown ceo than that
19Dominguez-Martinez et al. do not make this point. This is one of the ways our interpre-
tation of their model could be said to differ from their actual model.
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of a more established veteran. The reason is that the option to dismiss a poorly
performing ceo and hire a new one is like an exchange option. Consequently,
its value is greater, ceteris paribus, the greater is the amount of uncertainty.
Hermalin builds on this insight to examine the relationship between a board’s
structure and its propensity to hire a new ceo from the outside (an external
hire) versus from the inside (an internal hire). Presumably an internal hire is a
better-known commodity than an external hire, meaning that an external hire
offers greater uncertainty and, thus, a greater option value. An external hire
is, therefore, more valuable ceteris paribus. How much more valuable, however,
depends on the degree to which the board will monitor the ceo (its degree of
diligence). Like the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model, the board makes a
decision as to how intensively it will monitor the ceo, which is reflected in the
probability it will get an additional signal correlated with his ability.20 Without
the signal, there is no option value. Consequently, the value of uncertainty
about a new ceo is greater the more diligent the board (i.e., the more likely it
is to acquire the signal) and, therefore, a more diligent board is more willing to
trade off other attributes for greater uncertainty than is a less diligent board.
Hermalin argues that this insight offers an explanation for why there has been
a growing trend towards both more external hires and shorter ceo tenures:
Due to increased pressure from institutional shareholders, more government
regulations, greater threats of litigation, and new exchange requirements, boards
have become more independent and diligent.21 Hence, boards are more willing to
monitor, which raises the likelihood they hire externally for the ceo position.22
More monitoring directly raises the likelihood of ceo dismissal and indirectly
raises it if it leads firms to hire ceos about whom less is known.
One response of ceos to this greater monitoring pressure is for them to
work “harder” (which could be interpreted as taking less perquisites). Both
because they are led to work harder and their jobs are less secure, ceos will de-
mand greater pay in compensation. Hence, a consequence of more independent
boards over time could be upward pressure on ceo compensation.23 Figure 4
summarizes Hermalin’s model.24
20Alternatively, and essentially equivalently, the signal is always observed, but its precision
is an increasing function of the board’s efforts at monitoring. See §VI of Hermalin.
21See Huson et al. (2001) and Gillan and Starks (2000) for evidence on trends toward greater
board independence (technically, boards with a greater proportion of outside directors) and
the rise of institutional investors.
22See Borokhovich et al. (1996), Huson et al. (2001), and Dahya et al. (2002) for evidence
that the proportion of new ceo hires that are external has been increasing; the last provides
evidence for this trend outside the us.
23As Hermalin notes, the positive correlation between board independence and ceo pay in
time series need not imply a positive correlation in the cross section at any point in time.
Hermalin sketches an extension of his model that would predict a negative correlation in cross
section, despite a positive correlation over time. See his §V.
24It is worth noting that Hermalin is not the only theoretical explanation for the trend
toward more external hires and greater ceo compensation. Murphy and Za´bojn´ık (2003,
2004) offer a non-boards-based model that takes as its main premise that there has been a
decline in the value of managers’ firm-specific knowledge relative to the value of their general
knowledge. As they show, this will increase the willingness of firms to hire ceos externally.
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Figure 4: A graphical summary of the Hermalin (2005) model.
2.2.4 Other Assessment Models
A number of other papers examine the mechanisms associated with the board’s
assessment of the ceo. Graziano and Luporini (2005) also has a board that
seeks to determine ceo ability. Critical to their analysis is the presence of a
large shareholder on the board, one who is willing to bear the cost of monitoring,
but who also gains private benefits if the company pursues certain strategies
(projects). Because only the large shareholder will monitor, they find there can
be advantages to a dual-board system (e.g., as in much of continental Europe)
because it may be advantageous to divorce the monitoring role from the power to
have a say over the company’s strategy. Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994) assume
that boards always receive signals useful to assessing the ceo’s ability, but
boards differ insofar as some are lax and some are vigilant. Vigilant boards
may choose to fire the ceo on the basis of a bad signal. The situation in
Hirshleifer and Thakor is complicated by the possibility of a takeover bid by
an outside party with independent information about the firm; consequently, it
may behoove a vigilant board not to act on its own information, but wait to see
what information can be learned by the presence (or not) of a takeover bid and
the price bid. This article also exemplifies the fact that board governance is only
Given Murphy and Za´bojn´ık’s modeling of the ceo labor market, this greater willingness to
go outside translates into a rise in ceo compensation. Hermalin discusses how his model can
be extended to incorporate the Murphy and Za´bojn´ık model, see his §VI.
14
one source of managerial discipline and, more specifically, it captures the notion
that internal and external monitoring can serve as substitutes or complements.
Warther (1998) presents another model in which the board acquires information
about managerial ability. Here, unlike the other models we’ve discussed, each
director gets a private signal and aggregation of information is costly insofar
as a director who indicates he received a negative signal is at risk of losing his
board seat if he proves to be in the minority.
A recent strand of the literature has recognized that the board’s monitor-
ing of the ceo can create, in effect, a danger of opportunism or holdup by the
board.25 The ability to dismiss the ceo after he has made firm-specific in-
vestments means the board can appropriate some of the ceo’s returns, thereby
diminishing his original investment incentives. Two papers in this strand are
Almazan and Suarez (2003) and Laux (2008). In both, two critical assump-
tions are (i) initial contracts between board and ceo can be renegotiated and
(ii) at least some kinds of boards (strong in Almazan and Suarez, independent
in Laux) cannot commit to not behaving opportunistically or aggressively in
renegotiation.
In Almazan and Suarez, after being hired, a ceo can, at personal cost, take
a discrete action that raises, by a discrete amount, the probability that a given
strategy or project will succeed. This action is observable by the board, but not
verifiable, which creates an opportunity for later holdup. After the ceo takes
(sinks) his action, a profitable opportunity for the firm may arise that requires
a new ceo to exploit. If the board is strong enough to fire the incumbent ceo
in favor of a new ceo, then the board can use that possibility to obtain salary
concessions from the incumbent because losing his job means he loses a private
benefit. The threat of being forced to make such concessions can undermine the
ceo’s initial incentive to take the costly action.
To be more concrete, consider a variation on Almazan and Suarez’s idea:26
Suppose that the new opportunity has the same expected payoff as keeping
the incumbent ceo if he took the action and, thus, a higher expected payoff
than keeping him if he didn’t take the action. Suppose a weak board will
never fire the ceo when the expected value of keeping him equals that of the
new opportunity, but can fire him when the latter is greater. A strong board
is always capable of firing the ceo. Assume it is possible, when the threat to
dismiss the ceo is credible, for the board to capture, in renegotiation, the ceo’s
private benefit of control and push the ceo to some reservation utility (call it
0). Hence, a ceo with a strong board has no incentive to take the action: If
the new opportunity doesn’t arise, he retains his job no matter what he did,
there is no renegotiation of his compensation, and he enjoys the control benefit.
But if the new opportunity does arise he gets 0 regardless of his action; either
he is fired, thus denied both pay and private benefit, or through renegotiation
25Opportunism and holdup problems have been studied in a large number of areas of eco-
nomics since Williamson (1975, 1976).
26The actual Almazan and Suarez (2003) model is more complex than what we present here.
While those complications lead to a richer and more nuanced analysis, they are not necessary
to get the basic idea across.
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is forced down to a 0 reservation utility (payoff). Because his ultimate payoff
is independent of his action, he has no incentive to incur the cost of taking it.
The story is, however, different for a ceo who faces a weak board. Now, he is
strictly better off if he has taken the action and the new opportunity arises: The
board cannot threaten to fire him, so he continues to capture rents (wage plus
private benefit). If he didn’t take the action and the new opportunity arose,
then he would lose both wage and private benefit. If the new opportunity arises
with low frequency, so it is efficient for the incumbent ceo to take the action,
then having a weak board will be better than having a strong board.
In Almazan and Suarez, the distinction between strong and weak boards is
a distinction about their bargaining power. In Laux (2008), the board always
has all the bargaining power at the renegotiation stage (can make a take-it-
or-leave-it offer to the ceo), but boards differ in their degree of independence.
This variation in degree of independence acts, however, like a shift in bargaining
power. Consequently, for reasons similar to those in Almazan and Suarez, a firm
can be better off with a less independent board than a more independent board.
2.2.5 Additional Empirical Analyses of Assessment
There is both anecdotal and statistical evidence that boards dismiss poorly
performing ceos. Based on interviews, Mace (1971) and Vancil (1987) con-
clude that boards fire, albeit often reluctantly, poorly performing ceos. There
are numerous statistical analyses that show poor performance, measured ei-
ther as stock returns or accounting profits, positively predicts a change in the
ceo.27 Simply documenting a relationship between poor performance and an
increased probability of a ceo turnover, although suggestive of board monitor-
ing, is nonetheless far from conclusive. After all, a sense of failure or pressure
from shareholders could explain this relationship. To better identify the role
played by the board, Weisbach (1988) interacts board composition and firm
performance in a ceo turnover equation. His results indicate that when boards
are dominated by outside directors, ceo turnover is more sensitive to firm per-
formance than it is in firms with insider-dominated boards.28 This result is
consistent with the predictions of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Laux
27A problem facing empirical work is that firms often offer a face-saving rationale for a
change in ceo (e.g., he wishes to spend more time with his family) rather than admit the
ceo was forced out for doing a bad job. See Warner et al. (1988), Weisbach (1988), Parrino
(1997), and Jenter and Kanaan (2008) for further discussions of this issue and strategies for
dealing with it. To the extent non-performance-based ceo turnover is random, it simply adds
noise to turnover regressions, thus reducing the power of such tests, but leaves them unbiased
and consistent.
28Dahya et al. (2002); Dahya and McConnell (2007) find a similar result in the uk: Firms
that adopted the recommendations of the Cadbury Commission show a greater sensitivity of
ceo turnover to performance than non-adopting firms. Related, Goyal and Park (2002) find
that the sensitivity of ceo turnover to performance is less when the ceo also serves as board
chair. Adams and Ferreira (in press) find that the proportion of women on boards increases
the ceo performance-turnover sensitivity even after controlling for the proportion of outside
directors, which suggests that the proportion of female outside directors—directors outside of
the “old-boy network”—is proxying for board independence.
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(2008) under the presumption that outsider domination is a good proxy for
board independence.
Yermack (1996) also seeks to relate board structure to ceo turnover. Instead
of an interaction between board composition and performance, Yermack inter-
acts the log of board size with financial performance and finds a positive and
significant coefficient on this interaction term.29 That the coefficient is positive
indicates that firms with smaller boards have a stronger relationship between
poor performance and ceo turnover than do firms with larger boards. This find-
ing is consistent with the often-heard view that smaller boards are more vigilant
overseers of the ceo than larger boards. In particular, in response to poor per-
formance, they may not be paralyzed by free-riding or otherwise plagued with
inertia in the way that larger boards are.
Another of Yermack’s findings (supported by later work by Eisenberg et al.,
1998) is that board size and firm performance, the latter measured by average
Tobin’s Q, are negatively correlated.30 It is not obvious how to reconcile Yer-
mack’s results with the renegotiation-based models discussed previously: These
models suggest that too vigilant (here, small) a board is detrimental to a firm
insofar as it discourages the ceo from taking valuable actions or means such
actions can be implemented only at greater cost. Yermack’s findings could also
be at odds with Hermalin and Weisbach’s (1998) bargaining-based model: If
larger boards are less vigilant—effectively less independent—then the logic of
the Hermalin and Weisbach model suggests a successful ceo will bargain to
increase the size of his board. This would yield a prediction consistent with
Yermack’s interaction effect: Larger boards will be less responsive to a signal
of poor performance than smaller boards. However, because it is the more suc-
cessful ceos who have the larger boards, the Hermalin and Weisbach model
would seem to predict that firms with larger boards would outperform those
with smaller boards, which is contrary to Yermack’s findings.
It may be possible to reconcile Yermack’s finding with the Hermalin and
Weisbach model if (i) a successful ceo is a ceo that took successful advantage
of valuable growth opportunities his firm had; and (ii) the time it takes to
recognize the ceo was successful is sufficiently long that his firm would be
mature at the time it is recognized, leading to a lower Q.31
Such issues led Coles et al. (2008) to reestimate Yermack, but with greater
attention to heterogeneity issues. Consistent with the spirit of Figure 2 and the
conceptual framework set forth there, Coles et al. seek to control for the possi-
bility that boards have different sizes because firms face different problems. In
contrast to Yermack’s findings, Coles et al. find that firm performance (average
Tobin’s Q) is increasing in board size for certain types of firms, namely those
that are highly diversified or that are high-debt firms.
29See Faleye (2003) for a similar study.
30Average Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to their book value. A
presumption in the literature is that Q > 1 is partially a reflection of the good job management
is doing. As long as one controls for book value of assets, Tobin’s Q regressions are similar to
market-value regressions.
31The authors thank Rene´ Stulz for this insight.
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Perry (1999) breaks down the cross-sectional relationship between ceo turn-
over and firm performance by whether the outside directors are paid using incen-
tives. He finds that the relationship between ceo turnover and firm performance
is stronger when boards have incentives. This finding suggests that providing
explicit incentives to directors leads them to be more vigilant (act more in-
dependently). Beyond incentive reasons, another potential explanation is the
following: In firms that make use of incentive pay for directors, the directors
have a professional rather than a personal relationship with the ceo and, thus,
are relatively independent of him.
To conclude this section, it is worth noting that few analyses of ceo turnover
control for firm-specific heterogeneity using firm effects. As increasingly long
panel-data sets become available, future research will be able to shed more light
on within-firm changes in ceo turnover.
2.3 Setting of Strategy
In addition to making decisions concerning the hiring and firing of ceos, boards
may also be involved in the setting of strategy or, somewhat equivalently, the
selection of projects. Certainly surveys of directors—see the discussion of Demb
and Neubauer (1992) above—indicate that directors believe themselves to be
involved in setting strategy.
2.3.1 Theory
To an extent, many of the models discussed above could be modified to make
them about boards’ oversight of strategy. Instead of replacing the ceo, the
board compels him to change strategy. In an adaptation of Almazan and Suarez
(2003) or Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), the ceo could be assumed to have
an intrinsic preference for the incumbent strategy versus a replacement (the
incumbent strategy provides, e.g., more opportunity to consume perquisites).
In an adaptation of Laux (2008), similar results would follow if one assumed
the financial returns to the replacement strategy are independent of the ceo’s
initial actions.
An alternative modeling approach is to investigate the choice of strategy
as a game of information transmission: the ceo (or management more gener-
ally) has different preferences than the board concerning projects (strategies).
A number of observers are coming to the view that information transmission
between the board and the ceo is important for good governance (see, e.g.,
Holmstrom, 2005). This is particularly true when the ceo has payoff-relevant
private information, insofar as an agency problem arises because the ceo can
influence the board’s decision through the strategic release of information.
Adams and Ferreira (2007) build a model based on four broad assumptions:
(i) the ceo dislikes limits on his actions (loss of control); (ii) advice from the
board raises firm value without limiting a ceo’s actions; (iii) the effectiveness
of the board’s control and the value of its advice are better the more informed
the board is; and (iv) the board depends crucially on the ceo for firm-specific
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information. In the Adams and Ferreira model, the board can learn the amount,
a ∈ [0, 1], by which a project should be optimally adjusted (e.g., what the
appropriate level of investment in it should be). The board can do this, however,
only if the ceo has informed them about the project. It is assumed the ceo
can withhold that information, but if he chooses to share it, then he must do
so honestly (i.e., using the standard terminology of the contracts literature, the
information is “hard”). The ceo has a bias, b > 0, such that he likes to increase
the size of projects (e.g., invest more than is appropriate).32 Ignoring fixed
terms and additively separable aspects of their respective utilities, the utility of
the board and ceo as a function of the size of the project, s, and the true a are
quadratic losses,
UB = −(s− a)2 and UC = −(s− a− b)2 ,
respectively. The board’s knowledge of a is its private information. The board
can, however, send a message m ∈ [0, 1] as to what its value is. Unlike the
ceo’s information, the board’s information is “soft,” in that a false message
(i.e., m 6= a) can be sent. Provided the ceo has the power to choose s and the
board has learned a, the message-transmission subgame is a cheap-talk game
(Crawford and Sobel, 1982). This subgame has multiple equilibria, but one is
maximally—although not fully—revealing of the board’s information.
Observe that s 6= a (at least almost surely) because of the ceo’s bias and
the imperfection of information transmission in equilibrium. This provides the
board with a motive to assert control; that is, take the choice of s out of the
ceo’s hands. Suppose the board could always take control. Observe it would,
then, be in the ceo’s interest to have always informed it about the project.
Absent that information, the board would set s = µa, where µa = E{a}. The
ceo’s payoff would be a concave function of the random variable µa − a − b,
which has an expected value of −b. With the ceo’s information, the board
would set s = a. The ceo’s payoff would be a concave function of the constant,
−b. Since the former scenario is a mean-preserving spread of the second, it
follows that ceo will prefer the second; that is, revealing his information.
To generate further tension between the board and the ceo, Adams and
Ferreira assume the ceo suffers a personal loss, ℓ > 0, if control is taken from
him. Further, they assume the board is not necessarily assured of being able
to seize control. Rather, the board chooses the probability, π, that will seize
control. The board incurs a cost that is increasing in π. The marginal cost of
π is, however, falling in the board’s level of independence. The rationale for
this last assumption is that more independent boards find it easier to confront
the ceo than less independent boards. Under Adams and Ferreira’s maintained
assumptions, it is never optimal for the board to choose π = 1. Critically,
the board chooses π after the ceo has or has not revealed his information.
Moreover, because the value of seizing control is greater when the board can set
s = a rather than just = µa, the board will choose a greater value of π when
32Alternatively, one could assume he likes to economize on effort, so prefers smaller projects;
in this case, b < 0. The critical assumption is that b 6= 0.
19
it has been informed by the ceo than when it hasn’t. Consequently, the ceo
now has incentive to withhold his information: by withholding it, he raises the
probability he retains control (avoids losing ℓ).
If the board is sufficiently lacking in independence, then the probability of
its seizing control, even if the ceo reveals his information, is low. In fact, it can
be so low that the ceo is willing to run the increased risk of losing control that
follows his revealing his information in order to gain the board’s advice (i.e., the
informative message m), because the advice will help him reduce his expected
quadratic loss. Adams and Ferreira show that there can exist an interior equi-
librium in which, provided the board’s independence is below a cutoff, the ceo
indeed reveals his information. Conditional on the board’s independence being
at or below the cutoff, the firm’s expected profits are greatest if the board’s
independence equals the cutoff. At this level of independence, the expected
gain from being able to utilize the board’s information outweighs the expected
loss from the size of the project sometimes being distorted (i.e., in those states
when the ceo retains control). The Adams and Ferreira model also implies that
it may be optimal to separate the advisory and monitoring roles of the board;
that is, to have a dual board system as in many countries in Europe.
Harris and Raviv (in press) is similar in spirit to Adams and Ferreira. Har-
ris and Raviv assume that the ceo and the insider directors, like the outside
directors in Adams and Ferreira, have information relevant to the quadratic
loss. The payoffs, net of fixed terms and additively separable aspects of their
respective utilities, are
UO = −(s− aO − aI)2 and UI = −(s− aO − aI − b)2 ,
where the subscripts O and I denote outsiders and insiders, respectively, and at
is the information that the t group of directors have about the optimal size of the
project. Observe, now, that the optimal size from the shareholders’ perspective
is s = aO + aI . The value of at is the private information of the t group of
directors. Unlike in Adams and Ferreira, now it could be suboptimal, from the
shareholders’ perspective, to give control over s to the outsiders: although the
insiders will almost surely not choose the optimal s given control, they might
get closer if their information is particularly valuable (i.e., the variance of aI
is relatively big). Harris and Raviv consider two board structures: outsider
control and insider control. When group t has control, it has the choice of
choosing s or delegating the choice to the other group. When group t makes
the choice it receives a message from the other group about that other group’s
information. As in Adams and Ferreira, the equilibria of these cheap-talk games
do not permit full information revelation. When the insiders’ information is
sufficiently valuable relative to the outsiders’ (i.e., Var(aI)/Var(aO) ≥ κ > 1,
κ a constant that depends on parameter values) and information is valuable
relative to the agency problem (specifically, Var(aI)/b
2 ≥ ω > 1, ω a constant
that depends on parameter values), then insider control is superior to outsider
control. If those conditions aren’t met, then outsider control is superior.
Like Adams and Ferreira and Harris and Raviv, Raheja (2005) wishes to
understand board structure in the light of the board’s need to obtain information
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about the firm’s projects or strategies. Unlike Adams and Ferreira, where all
board members are equally ignorant, or Harris and Raviv, where both inside
and outside directors respectively have private information, Raheja assumes that
only the inside directors possess private information. In contrast to most of the
literature, Raheja departs from the idea that the non-ceo inside directors and
the ceo have coincident incentives. Insiders control the ceo through the threat
of “ratting” him out to the outsiders, who will then join with the insiders in
firing the ceo, should the ceo misbehave.
Although a clever model, it is difficult to reconcile Raheja’s model with the
evidence in Mace (1971) or Vancil (1987). Insubordination by a ceo’s man-
agement team seems exceedingly rare. Moreover, what evidence there is about
whistle-blowers (rats) is hardly encouraging for Raheja’s model. Anecdotal ev-
idence, at least, suggests that whistle-blowers tend to suffer, more than be
rewarded, for their actions (see, e.g., Lublin, 2002). Evidence of whistle-blowers
going to outside directors is rare—the most prominent recent whistle-blower,
Enron’s Sherron Watkins, for instance went to the ceo (Ken Lay) with her
concerns.
Song and Thakor (2006) also consider information transmission relevant to
project selection. Like some other work in this area, they build on the career-
concerns notions of Holmstrom (1999). Unlike previous work, they assume that
both the board and the ceo have career concerns. Unlike Holmstrom, who
assumes all actors are equally ignorant about theirs and others’ abilities, Song
and Thakor assume that both the ceo and board each know their own abilities.
In the Song and Thakor model, ceo ability means how likely the ceo is to
identify a project to undertake; whereas board ability means how accurate the
board is at assessing the value of any project put forth by the ceo. Independent
of his ability, the ceo also obtains a signal of a project’s quality, which he can
pass along truthfully or not to the board. Song and Thakor show that when
the probability of good projects is low, then the board will be biased toward
underinvestment. If the probability of good projects is high, however, then
the board will be biased toward overinvesting. Song and Thakor suggest that
the probability of good projects will be low during economic downturns and
high during economic booms, which means their model offers an explanation
of changes in governance over the business cycle: during downturns, the board
will be tougher and, during upturns, the board will be more lenient.
The Song and Thakor model is rather complex, with many moving parts.
To provide some intuition for its results, consider an adaptation of Hermalin
and Weisbach (2008) motivated by Song and Thakor. Assume a risk-averse ceo
with career concerns a` la Holmstrom (1999). Assume his ability, unknown ex
ante to all, is α ∼ N(0, 1/τ), where N(µ, σ2) denotes a normal distribution with
mean µ and variance σ2.33 A project arises that will payoff r+α+ε, where r is a
known constant reflecting the current economic environment and ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε).
A public signal, s, about the ceo’s ability is realized after the project arises, but
before the board must commit to the project. Assume s ∼ N(α, 1/q), where
33While the realization of α is unknown by anyone, all distributions are common knowledge.
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q is a measure of the board’s quality. Note the unconditional distribution of
s is N(0, 1/H), where 1/H = 1/τ + 1/q. Normalize the firm’s revenues if the
board decides not to pursue the project to be 0. Using the standard formula for
forming posteriors from normal distributions (see, e.g., DeGroot, 1970, p. 167),
the expected value of the project conditional on the signal is
r +
qs
q + τ
.
The board proceeds with the project if that is positive; that is, if
s ≥ − (q + τ)r
q
≡ S .
Given the option of blocking a negative npv project, the firm’s expected value
prior to the reception of the signal is
V =
∫ ∞
−∞
max
{
0, r +
qs
q + τ
}√
H
2π
exp
(
−H
2
s2
)
ds− w
=
√
H
τ
φ
(
S
√
H
)
+
(
1− Φ(S
√
H)
)
r − w , (1)
where w is the ceo’s compensation, φ(·) is the density function of a standard
normal random variable (i.e., with mean zero and variance one), and Φ(·) is the
corresponding distribution function.
Differentiating V with respect to q, it is readily shown that the firm’s ex-
pected value, V , is increasing in the quality of the board, q, all else held equal.
Intuitively, the ability to block a bad project creates an option. An option that
is never exercised is worthless; hence, if the signal were complete noise, as would
be the case if board had zero quality (recall the signal’s variance is 1/q), there
would be effectively no option. As the quality of the board and, thus, informa-
tion improves, the more valuable this option becomes and, therefore, the more
valuable the firm becomes.
It is not, however, costless to increase board quality without bound. First,
it seems reasonable that higher quality directors command a premium or that
providing a board with sufficient incentives to do a high-quality job is expensive.
So the cost of board quality is increasing in quality. Under suitable assumptions
about this cost function (e.g., that marginal cost be rising in q), there will be
an optimal finite value for q. In addition, if the ceo labor market reacts to the
signal so that the ceo’s future salary is an increasing function of the signal,
then the ceo is exposed to more future salary risk the more informative the
signal is (i.e., the greater is q). Intuitively, the posterior estimate of the ceo’s
ability is a weighted average of the prior, which is fixed, and the signal, which
is noisy. The more informative the signal is known to be, the more weight is
assigned the signal. This increases the ceo’s risk more than the lower variance
of the signal itself reduces it (see Hermalin and Weisbach, 2008, for details).
A ceo will require compensation for this greater risk, so his initial salary (w
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in expression (1)) will have to be greater. In light of this cost, under suitable
conditions, it will again be the case that a finite q is optimal.
From expression (1), the marginal net return to q is
1
2τq2
φ
(−rτ√
H
)
H3/2 − ∂w
∂q
(note S
√
H = −rτ/√H). The change in the marginal net return to q with
respect to r, the measure of the current economic environment, has the same
sign as
d
dr
φ
(−rτ√
H
)
< 0 ;
where the inequality follows because an increase in r is a move further into the
left tail of the density. Therefore, the marginal net return to q is falling in
r, which means that the optimal quality of the board is lower when economic
conditions are good (i.e., r is high) than when they are bad (i.e., r is low).
Intuitively, when times are good, the board will wish to let mediocre ceos go
ahead with projects, but they won’t when times are bad. Consequently, the
value of improving the monitoring of projects is greater when times are bad
than when they are good.
Baranchuk and Dybvig (in press) is an interesting article in this area because
it is not worried about information transmission between ceo and board, but
among the various board members themselves (which, in practice, includes the
ceo). Each director i has a belief, ai ∈ Rn, as to what the firm should do.
Similar to Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (in press), a director
expects to suffer a quadratic loss in the distance between his beliefs as to what
the firm should do and what the firm’s actual course of action, aˆ, is; that is, a
director’s utility is
−‖ai − aˆ‖ .
The directors arrive at aˆ according to a solution concept that the authors call
consensus. This solution concept has many desirable properties, including exis-
tence for all such games. A weakness of the concept, however, is that there is no
explicit extensive-form game to which it is a solution (consensus is a cooperative
game-theoretic concept). Another issue is there is no scope for directors to up-
date their beliefs based on what they learn of others’ beliefs. Absent biases on
the part of the directors, it is not clear why the directors would not freely share
their information and arrive at a consensus belief, which in turn would lead to
a unanimous choice as to what the firm should do.
By the revelation principle, the information-transmission models discussed
here could all be solved by a direct-revelation mechanism if complete contract-
ing were possible.34 That is, if the parties could fully commit and monetary
transfers of any level among them were feasible, then the parties could achieve
an informationally constrained optimum via contracting. There would, there-
fore, be no need to worry about board composition or control. Hence, as is
34Note Song and Thakor is not an information-transmission model.
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common of many models seeking to explain the institutions we observe, there
is a reliance, at some level, on the assumption that contracting is necessarily
incomplete. In particular, either boards cannot commit fully as to how they will
use the information revealed to them or it is infeasible contractually for them to
pay the ceo (or others) in a manner sufficient to induce efficient revelation. For
instance, in Harris and Raviv (in press), a direct-revelation mechanism would do
better than the equilibrium outcomes considered provided that the parties could
contract directly on the size of the project as a function of their announcements
and they could make transfers. Although this literature tends not to explore
fully why contracts are incomplete, casual empiricism would suggest that there
are, indeed, limits to both commitments and transfers. So, realistically, organi-
zations are necessarily in a second- or third-best situation. Consequently, the
“law of the second best” often applies—to remedy, in part, the second- or third-
best problem, the parties can gain by introducing another, partially offsetting
problem.35 In the literature on boards, the offsetting “problem” is having a less
diligent/less controlling/less independent board. Having a “lax” board is a way
of partially committing to how information will be used, thereby mimicking,
in part, the commitment that a contractual solution, were one feasible, would
provide.
2.3.2 Empirical and Experimental Evidence
Gillette et al. (2003, 2008) perform a series of interesting experiments designed
to get at the issue of information transmission within the boardroom. In Gillette
et al. (2003), they consider a laboratory setting in which informed insiders are
grouped with uninformed outsiders in a simulated boardroom setting. They find
that the inclusion of outsiders improves welfare, by making undesirable equi-
libria less likely. Gillette et al. (2008) compare, again in a laboratory setting,
single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider
controlled boards. They find that two-tiered boards tend to be overly conser-
vative in their choices and that outsider-controlled boards tend to lead to the
most efficient payoffs.
The class of models based on strategic information transfer implicitly relies
on the assumption that outsider directors are less well informed than are inside
directors. Ravina and Sapienza (in press) adopt a clever approach to testing
this assumption. These authors examine the relative profitability of trades in
their companies’ stocks made by outsiders and insiders and find that both types
of directors earn abnormal profits, but that insiders earn better returns than
do outsiders. These results suggest that both types of directors have access to
inside information but that outsiders information is strictly worse than insiders’.
Thus the finding supports the underlying assumption of the information-based
models of boards.
35An example of the law of the second best is, for instance, encouraging some degree of
cartelization of a polluting industry: By reducing competition, price will be driven above
private marginal cost; hence, society may hope to get price closer to social marginal cost (i.e.,
cost inclusive of the negative externality caused by the pollution).
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Schmidt (2008) considers a situation in which advice could be particularly
valuable, namely during mergers and acquisitions. On the basis of the social
ties between the ceo and other directors, he classifies boards as “friendly”
(ties exist) and “unfriendly” (a continuous measure is also employed). When
it is likely that directors possess valuable information about an acquisition (an
index measure), the returns of the acquirer are higher on announcement of the
acquisition for bidders with more friendly boards. Conversely, when the need to
discipline the manager is a greater concern, social ties prove to be a negative.
Although there is a growing empirical literature seeking to estimate the role
of directors in strategy setting, it is safe to say that this is an area in which
much work remains to be done.
3 How are Boards of Directors Structured?
We have discussed some explanations for why there are boards, and why one
might expect endogenously-chosen boards to provide monitoring of manage-
ment, despite the fact that management typically has some say over the board’s
composition. But the theories simply provide a stylized description of the un-
derlying tensions in the role of the board in corporate governance. Actual
governance is much richer than these bare-bones characterizations.
There are a number of questions that can only be answered by looking at
data on real-world boards of directors. How are boards structured in practice?
Does this structure coincide with the earlier-discussed theories? How has it
changed over time, both in response to changes in the economy and regulatory
environments?
3.1 Some Facts
Observers typically divide directors into two groups: inside directors and outside
directors. Generally, a director who is a full-time employee of the firm in question
is deemed to be an inside director, while a director whose primary employment is
not with the firm is deemed to be an outside director. Outside directors are often
taken to be independent directors, yet the independence of some directors who
meet the definition of an outsider is questionable. Examples of such directors
are lawyers or bankers who do business with the company. Outsiders of dubious
independence are sometimes put in a third category in empirical work (see, e.g.,
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988): “affiliated” or “gray” directors. In recent years,
public pressure and regulatory requirements have led firms to have majority-
outsider boards.
The characteristics of boards of large U.S. corporations have been described
in a number of studies. For example, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) consider a
sample of 508 of the largest US corporations between 1989 and 1995. They find
that, on average, outsiders make up 55% of directors, insiders 30%, and affili-
ated directors the remaining 15%. The average board contains twelve directors,
each receiving approximately $36,000 in fees (plus stock options), and has 7.5
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meetings a year. A number of the directors served on multiple boards; the out-
side directors in these firms averaged over three directorships. While these data
are for large public firms, Linck et al. (2008) consider a larger sample of 8000
(necessarily) smaller firms, with similar patterns in the data.
While the existence and basic structure of boards have remained relatively
constant over time, the way in which they are composed has changed. Lehn et al.
(in press) consider a sample of 81 firms that have survived as public companies
from 1935 until 2000. Survivorship bias complicates the interpretation of their
findings, nevertheless they reflect some basic trends that have affected boards.
First, board size appears to have a hump pattern over time; it averages 11 in
1935, peaks at 15 in 1960 and declines to 11 in 2000. However, board size has
become more uniform over time as the standard deviation of board size drops
from 5.5 in 1935 to 2.7 in 2000. These companies’ boards have become more
outsider-dominated as well; insider representation drops from 43% in 1935 to
just 13% in 2000. Part of this drop can be explained by the typical life cycle of
firms. As founding families exit and firms become more professionally managed,
agency problems can become worse as those in control are no longer significant
owners. In response, firms will wish to add outside directors to counteract the
increased agency problems.
Since 2000, there have been significant changes. Sarbanes-Oxley contained a
number of requirements that increased the workload of and the demand for out-
side directors (see Linck et al. (in press) for a description of these requirements).
In addition, the scandals at Enron and Worldcom have led to substantially in-
creased public scrutiny of corporate governance. Consequently, boards have
become larger, more independent, have more committees, meet more often, and
generally have more responsibility and risk (again see Linck et al., in press).
These changes both increased the demand for directors and decreased the will-
ingness of directors to serve for a given price. It is not surprising, therefore,
that director pay and liability insurance premiums have increased substantially.
From the shareholders’ perspective, the net effect of this regulation is not clear;
future research will need to address the extent to which the additional monitor-
ing offsets the incremental costs imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley.
3.2 Factors in Board Composition that Potentially Affect
a Board’s Actions
We have already discussed much of the literature relating board composition (in
terms of the insider-to-outsider ratio) and board size to board actions regarding
oversight of the ceo, as well as to overall firm performance (see section 2.2).
Yet beyond the insider-to-outsider ratio and board size, other board attributes
no doubt play a role. Each board of directors is likely to have its own dynamics,
a function of many factors including the personalities and relationships among
the directors, their backgrounds and skills, and their incentives and connections.
Some of these factors are readily measured while others are not. There has
been considerable research that seeks to estimate the impact of various board
characteristics on board conduct and firm performance.
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3.2.1 CEO-Chairman Duality
Many ceos also hold the title of Chairman of the Board; this duality holds in
almost 80% of large us firms (see Rechner and Dalton, 1991). This structure is
viewed by many as giving ceos greater control at the expense of other parties,
including outside directors. To mitigate the consequent problems, many ob-
servers of corporate governance have called for a prohibition on the ceo serving
as chairman (see, e.g., Jensen, 1993).
A number of recent papers have examined the use of dual titles in corporate
governance empirically. Brickley et al. (1997) estimates the performance effects
of combined titles. These authors find little evidence that combining or sepa-
rating titles affects corporate performance. They conclude that the separation
and combination of titles is part of the natural succession process described by
Vancil (1987). In contrast, Goyal and Park (2002) find that the sensitivity of
ceo turnover to performance is lower when titles are combined, consistent with
the notion that the combination of titles is associated with increased power over
the board. Similarly, Adams et al. (2005) find evidence consistent with the view
that ceos also holding the chairman title appear to hold greater influence over
corporate decision-making.
Overall, these studies are consistent with the view that combined titles are
associated with ceos having more influence in the firm. However, this relation is
not necessarily causal. Influence inside an organization arises endogenously, and
with influence generally come fancier titles. The Goyal and Park and Adams
et al. findings potentially reflect ceo power that came about endogenously
through a manner similar to that described in the Hermalin andWeisbach (1998)
model. In other words, a ceo who performs well would be rewarded by his being
given the chairman title as well. Such a process, especially if the increase in
power arises because of a demonstrated high ability, would not necessarily imply
performance changes following shifts in titles, consistent with the Brickley et al.
findings.
Even if it is true that combining the titles of ceo and chairman means that
an individual has, on average more influence over his firm, it does not follow
that mandating separate titles would improve corporate performance. In fact,
Adams et al.—similar to Brickley et al.—find that measures of CEO power are
not systematically related to firm performance. This is consistent with our over-
arching argument that actual corporate-governance practice needs to be seen as
part of the solution to the constrained optimization program that is corporate-
governance design. Hence, imposing separate titles would either yield a less
optimal solution or lead to a, possibly inefficient, work-around that maintained
the optimal amount of ceo power.36 Moreover, as noted earlier, making the
ceo’s job worse likely means an offsetting increase in pay as compensation. Con-
sequently, as with most policy prescriptions in the area of governance, policy
makers should be wary of calls for prohibiting the ceo serving as chairman.
36Recall that, in a number of models of boards, ceding some control to management is
optimal (see e.g., Almazan and Suarez, 2003, Laux, 2008, Adams and Ferreira, 2007, and
Harris and Raviv, in press).
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3.2.2 Staggered Boards
A common, yet controversial, governance arrangement is known as “staggered
boards.” When a firm has a staggered board, instead of holding annual elections
for each director, directors are elected for multiple years at a time (usually
three), and only a fraction (usually a third) of the directors are elected in a
given year. This practice is typically adopted as a way of shielding a firm from
takeover because a potential acquirer cannot quickly take control of the firm’s
board even it controls 100% of the votes. This arrangement is more common
that one might imagine—in the Faleye (2007) sample, roughly half of the firms
have classified (staggered) boards.
While the consequence of the separation of the ceo and chairman positions
on firm performance is ambiguous, less ambiguity exists with respect to stag-
gered boards; the empirical evidence indicates this arrangement is not in the
shareholders’ interests (although, as with much of the empirical work, caution is
warranted due to joint-endogeneity issues). Both Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) and
Mahoney and Mahoney (1993) find negative returns when firms announce they
are classifying their boards (although Jarrell and Poulsen’s finding is not sta-
tistically significant). Bebchuk et al. (2002) find that a classified board almost
doubles the odds that a firm remains independent when faced with a hostile
takeover. Because some would-be acquirers are no doubt scared off by the stag-
gered board, the Bebchuk et al. findings likely underestimate the ability of a
classified board to resist takeovers. Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) find that firms
with staggered boards have lower value than other firms, using Tobin’s Q as a
measure of value. Finally, Faleye (2007) finds that a staggered board lowers the
sensitivity of ceo turnover to firm performance.
An implication of the view that staggered boards entrench managers and
decrease value is that when firms “de-stagger,” return to annual elections for
all directors, value should increase. Guo et al. (2008) consider a sample of firms
that de-stagger and find that the value of these firms does, in fact, increase.
They also find that de-staggering is not typically initiated by managers, but
by activist shareholders. Subsequent to the de-staggering, investor reaction
indicates that these firms are more likely to be takeover targets. All of these
findings reinforce the view that staggering boards is a mechanism that serves to
protect management by making takeovers difficult.
All in all, it appears that firms with staggered boards do worse than firms
with annual board elections. Of course, some of this effect could be due to en-
dogeneity; firms with already entrenched managers are more likely to be able to
convince shareholders to adopt staggered boards. Or, to take a less sinister view,
those managers who prove themselves are in a position to bargain for greater job
security as part of an optimal (second-best) bargain for their continued service
(and those who fail to prove themselves become vulnerable to de-staggering and
takeover). In this light, stock-market reaction to announcements about whether
the board will be staggered or not could be due to the news such announcements
convey vis-a`-vis the bargaining toughness and independence of the board rather
than to simply whether the board is or isn’t staggered.
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3.3 The Role of Particular Types of Outside Directors
To be considered an outsider, a director’s primary employment must be with a
different organization than the firm on whose board he serves. Outside directors
typically have backgrounds that will enable them to be valuable to a board, or
to represent an important constituency. A small literature considers particular
types of directors and their specific roles in corporate governance.
3.3.1 Bankers
Many firms have bankers on their boards. Bankers may be added to boards
both because they can monitor the firm for the lender for whom they work and
because they can provide financial expertise. Both Booth and Deli (1996) and
Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) consider the extent to which bankers play a monitor-
ing role. These authors find that, when a director is aﬄiated with a bank lending
to the firm, the firm’s overall debt ratio is lower. This finding is consistent with
a view that such an affiliated director can protect the bank’s interest by discour-
aging the firm from taking out loans from other banks that could increase the
risk to the director’s bank. While monitoring through directorships may benefit
a bank, Kroszner and Strahan (2001) argue that such monitoring also involves
costs. In particular, bankers can be held legally liable if they are on the boards
of firms that enter financial distress. Consistent with the idea that monitoring
through directorships is costly, they find that bankers are more likely to be on
the boards of large, stable firms. They also argue that liability explains why
fewer bankers are on boards of non-financial us firms than in other countries,
such as Germany and Japan. Gu¨ner et al. (in press) find evidence suggesting
that adding commercial bankers to boards increases a firm’s ability to access
debt markets, but that the firms that utilize this increased financial flexibility
the most are those firms with good credit but poor investment opportunities.
Gu¨ner et al. argue that having bankers on boards can be a double-edged sword,
in that the bankers can improve a firm’s access to capital markets, but some-
times this improved access works to the benefit of the bank rather than the firm
doing the borrowing. Because they have panel data, Gu¨ner et al. are able to
address, in two ways, the problem that financing needs may drive the appoint-
ment of bank directors instead of vice versa. First, they use firm fixed effects
to control for heterogeneity among firms. Second, they argue that bankers as-
sociated with failing banks are less attractive as directors. Thus an instrument
for the number of commercial bankers on the board is the number of directors
hired during financial crises.
3.3.2 Venture Capitalists
Many firms are founded with funding from venture capitalists. As a condition
of receiving funding, new enterprises must yield some degree of control to the
venture capitalists. Venture capitalists have a fiduciary responsibility to their
own investors to exit these enterprises relatively quickly, and generally leave
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these enterprises’ boards when they sell their ownership stake in them. De-
spite the shortness of vcs’ tenures as directors, a study by Baker and Gompers
(2003) suggests that their presence can affect firms long after they have left the
board. Baker and Gompers find that the initial presence of a venture capital
investor, especially one with a strong reputation, is likely to decrease the ceo’s
bargaining power relative to the board. Empirically, a high-reputation venture
capitalist leads to a more powerful board, even after the venture capitalist exits
his investment. The interpretation of this result is that such a venture capitalist
negotiates substantially more control rights than is typical for outside investors
in other private firms. When these firms go public, this balance of power away
from management tends to persist, leading ceos in vc-backed firms to have less
control over their boards than ceos in non-vc-backed firms.
3.3.3 Politically-Connected Directors
Firms that deal regularly with government, such as regulated utilities, or ones
with significant government contracts, place a high value on being able to influ-
ence governmental decisions. Consequently, these firms should have a demand
for directors with political connections. Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) test this
hypothesis, and, not surprisingly, find that firms that are more reliant on gov-
ernmental decisions are more likely to appoint directors with backgrounds in law
and politics. Extending this idea, Goldman et al. (in press) consider the nature
of these connections in greater detail. These authors classify directors by the
party to which they belong. Around the time of the 2000 election, which was
a very close win for the George W. Bush and the Republican party, firms with
Republican-connected boards increased in value while Democratic-connected
firms decreased in value. This finding emphasizes the value politically-connected
directors can provide and, consequently, the importance of these connections to
firms.
3.3.4 CEOs as Directors
Sometimes an outside director of one firm is the ceo of another. ceos of other
firms clearly have management skills and an understanding of the issues facing
top management. Fahlenbrach et al. (2008) consider the effect of having ceo
directors on boards. These authors find no evidence, however, that ceos on
boards add value, at least relative to other outside directors. This conclusion
is somewhat at odds with Fich (2005), discussed in detail later, which finds the
announcement that ceos of well-performing firms will be added to the board
generates positive abnormal returns.
Fellow ceos on the board may, however, reduce firm value in at least one
circumstance, namely when a ceo is added to a board as a part of an interlock;
that is, when the ceo of one firm is added to the board of a second while the
second’s ceo simultaneously serves on the board of the first. When directors are
added as interlocks, Fahlenbrach et al. find that firm performance declines. This
decline is attributed to mutual “back-scratching”: The implicit threat of what
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the first ceo can do for or against the second in the first’s role as director causes
the second to act more favorably toward the first in the second’s role as director.
Consistent with this idea, Hallock (1997) finds that interlocked directors receive
abnormally high pay. Similar results are found in Kramarz and Thesmar (2006)
and Larcker et al. (2005), who use more sophisticated measures of connections
between ceos and boards, and find evidence of worse firm performance and
higher ceo pay at firms in which the ceo has connections to the board. Fich and
White (2005) explore, more generally, the reasons why ceos sit on each other’s
boards. They find that measures of ceo bargaining power—tenure, evidence
of ability (Tobin’s Q), and sitting on the nominating committee—are positively
correlated with interlocks, while ceo ownership is negatively correlated. These
findings are consistent with a view of interlocks as a means of providing the ceo
job security. Finally, Bizjak et al. (in press) find that board interlocks increase
the likelihood of “option backdating,” a controversial practice that serves to
increase top management’s pay by ex post adjusting the date on which options
are dated. This finding supports the view that boards play a role in setting
corporate policies and provides further evidence that interlocked boards benefit
management, possibly at the expense of shareholders.
Overall, there appears to be substantial evidence that interlocks and other
outside personal relationships between the ceo and his directors can be asso-
ciated with poor performance. As before, however, interpreting these results
is tricky due to the underlying endogeneity problem. It is difficult to know if
the board structure determines the firm’s performance or the board structure
is merely a manifestation of the power a ceo has over his firm and the prob-
lems that stem from that. In addition, ceos may be invited to join the boards
of firms that are performing poorly. These distinctions are not merely of aca-
demic interest; policies to regulate board composition are often proposed and
sometimes enacted. The extent to which these policies are likely to be effective
depends crucially on the extent to which the board structure causally changes
firm performance and is not merely a symptom of underlying issues inside the
firm.
Another issue with ceos as directors is why should the firm the ceo manages
permit him to devote time and effort to other firms? Conyon and Read (2006)
offer a theoretical explanation. Serving on the boards of other firms helps to
build the ceo’s human capital. Moreover, the firm can subtract the opportunity
cost of his time and effort away from the firm from the compensation it pays
him. The interest of the ceo and his firm’s owners are not, however, perfectly
aligned on this matter insofar as the ceo also gains a personal benefit from
service on the boards of other companies (e.g., additional income and prestige).
Hence, a firm that did not limit the number of directorships its ceo could accept
would find that the ceo accepts more directorships than would be optimal from
the shareholders’ perspective. Perry and Peyer (2005) provide some evidence
consistent with this argument. They find that accepting additional director-
ships benefits the “sending firm” primarily when the sending firm appears to be
well-governed. But when the sending firm exhibits potential agency problems,
additional directorships appear value-decreasing.
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3.3.5 Stakeholder Representatives on Boards
Often, especially outside the us, a variety of constituencies (stakeholders) with
an interest in a firm are represented on the firm’s board. A particularly impor-
tant set of such stakeholders is labor. Presumably the reason why labor is eager
to gain such representation is to influence management to take actions favorable
to workers. Faleye et al. (2006) find evidence that supports this notion: Labor-
controlled publicly traded firms tend to invest less in long-term assets, take fewer
risks, and exhibit lower labor and total factor productivity. Similarly, Gorton
and Schmid (2004) consider employee representation on supervisory boards in
Germany. These authors find that when labor has equal representation, firms
trade at a 31% discount to firms with 1/3 employee representation, and have
higher payrolls. Both the Faleye et al. and Gorton and Schmid articles suggest
that, when labor can affect firm policies, either through board representation
or equity ownership, it is able to influence firm policies to benefit workers at
the expense of shareholders. However, Fauver and Fuerst (2006) find that labor
representation on the boards of German firms is associated with better perfor-
mance, particularly in firms which have a greater need for coordination. This
suggests that labor can bring valuable first-hand knowledge to the board.
4 How Does The Board Work?
The discussion of boards so far has left the working of the board as a black
box. What they do has been discussed, but not how they do it. How do boards
function? What are the mechanics by which they do their jobs? These are
questions to which we now turn.
An obvious problem in addressing these questions is that what happens
inside a boardroom is necessarily private. While some academic research has
tried to uncover these workings of the board through interviews and case studies
(see Section 2.1 supra), most research has relied on publicly observable data that
arguably shed light on the inner workings of the board.
4.1 The Working of Teams
A board of directors is a team. There is a lengthy theoretical literature in
economics on the workings of teams (see Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005, §8.1
for an introduction). As, however, was noted earlier, application of this theory
to boards does not always lead to clear predictions. For instance, total board
effort can increase or decrease with the size of the board.
One might hope to resolve such ambiguous theoretical predictions by turn-
ing to the data. If, for example, total board effort is positively correlated with
outcomes, then a potential test of size on total effort would be to examine
the relation between outcomes and board size. Although, as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2, such tests have been run, their interpretation is complicated by joint-
endogeneity issues. The work that best controls for those issues, Coles et al.
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(2008), finds ambiguous results: For “simple” firms, Tobin’s Q decreases in
board size; while, for “complex” firms, it increases in board size.37
One interpretation of Coles et al.’s results is as follows. Directors provide the
ceo with advice, as suggested by field work (see Section 2.1). Advice is more
valuable the more complex the firm.38 This is a factor in favor of increasing
board size when the firm is “complex.”
Without meaning to suggest this isn’t the correct interpretation, it does
raise questions. Although consistent with field work, one might speculate as to
why the ceo relies on the board rather than, say, management consultants for
advice. And why is it that the total quality or amount of advice increases with
board size (i.e., why is it that the free-riding problem isn’t so severe as to make
these values decrease with size)?
Alternatively, complex firms could be more difficult to monitor, which could,
in theory, warrant more monitors (a larger board). Specifically, let C(n) be the
cost of having n directors (e.g., the amount of their compensation plus other
associated expenditures). Suppose that, if a problem exists, the independent
probability that a given director detects it to be sp, where s is a measure of the
simplicity of the firm and p is a constant. Without loss of generality, normalize
the probability of a problem existing times the benefit of correcting it to one.
Then a firm chooses its number of directors, n, to maximize(
1− (1− sp)n)− C(n) . (2)
The cross-partial derivative of (2) with respect to s and n is
(1− sp)n−1p+ n(1− sp)n−1 log(1− sp)p ,
which has the same sign as
1 + n log(1− sp) . (3)
If sp > .632 or for n large enough, (3) is negative—the marginal return to
adding directors is decreasing in the simplicity of the firm. Hence, it is optimal
for simpler firms to have fewer directors than should more complex firms.
37A complex firm is one that scores above the median on an index of complexity, a simple
firm is one that scores below. The index is positively related to the number of business
segments a firm has, its size, and its leverage.
38For instance, suppose the quality of advice from director i is qi, where qi
iid
∼ F . The ceo
adopts the best advice, which, assume, has a monetary payoff proportional to max qi/s, where
s is the simplicity of the firm. The benefit from n directors is
1
s
Z ∞
0
qnFn−1(q)f(q)dq ≡
1
s
E{max q|n} .
The cross-partial derivative of that expression with respect to s and n is
−
1
s2
×
dE{max q|n}
dn
< 0 ,
where the sign follows because the expectation of the extreme value is increasing in the number
of draws. Hence, the marginal benefit of adding directors is declining in the simplicity of the
firm.
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4.2 Busy Directors
Firms generally want to have outside directors who are distinguished individuals
who also have an ability to add value as directors. Many of these individuals have
demanding full-time jobs, such as ceos, attorneys, or bankers. Even if directors
do not have full-time jobs, some of them are in sufficient demand that they serve
on many boards, sometimes as many as ten simultaneously. A concern often
voiced about this arrangement is that such “extremely busy” directors will not
be able to devote sufficient effort to any one board. The alternative argument
is that the directors who are considered “busy” are in fact chosen to be on so
many boards precisely because of their high ability, which serves to offset the
effect of their lack of time. Not surprisingly, therefore, the effectiveness of such
“busy” directors has become an active area of interest.
4.2.1 Theory
The simple theory behind the problem of busy directors is that, the busier a
director is, the less effort he or she devotes to each of his or her duties. This idea
is readily modeled: Suppose, for simplicity, that the benefit a director derives
from effort expenditure is the same for all her activities. Hence, her total benefit
is
∑M
m=1 b(am), where am is effort expended on themth activity, b : R+ → R+ is
the common benefit function, andM is the total number of activities. Critically,
assume spending more effort on activity m increases her marginal cost of effort
on activity j for any pair of activities m and j. This would, for instance, be
true if her cost of effort function were c(
∑M
m=1 am), where c(·) is increasing and
convex (e.g., her utility for leisure exhibits diminishing marginal utility). If b(·)
is concave, then the director optimally allocates her efforts equally across her
activities; specifically, effort on activity m satisfies the first-order condition
b′(am)− c′

 M∑
j=1
aj

 = 0 . (4)
We can rewrite (4) as
b′
(
a∗(M)
)− c′(Ma∗(M)) = 0 , (5)
where a∗(M) is the optimal amount of effort she expends on any one activity
given that she is undertakingM activities. Using (5), it follows that a∗(M+1) <
a∗(M); that is, if assigned one more activity (board seat), her effort on any given
activity falls.39
39Proof: Suppose not; that is, suppose a∗(M + 1) ≥ a∗(M). Because her marginal costs
are rising in total effort, it follows that
c′
`
Ma∗(M)
´
< c′
`
(M + 1)a∗(M + 1)
´
.
Expression (5) then entails
b′
`
a∗(M)
´
< b′
`
a∗(M + 1)
´
;
but, because she has diminishing marginal benefits, this last expression implies the contradic-
tion a∗(M) > a∗(M + 1).
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A problem with this simple model is that the number of board seats held
by a director is not an exogenous variable (i.e., our director is not compelled to
accept M seats). Rather a director has choice. This makes M an endogenous
variable, implying that we need to ask why some directors choose to be busier
than others. This, in turn, can alter our conclusion that busier directors devote
less effort on a given board than their less-busy colleagues. To see this, assume
there are types of directors, where a director of type θ derives benefit θb(am)
from effort expended on her mth activity. A type-θ director’s utility, as a
function of M , is
Mθb
(
a∗(M)
)− c(Ma∗(M)) . (6)
Utilizing the envelope theorem, the cross-partial derivative of (6) with respect
to M and θ is readily shown to be b
(
a∗(M)
)
> 0; that is, higher-type directors
enjoy a greater marginal benefit from adding an activity than do lower-type
directors. Consequently, higher-type directors will optimally choose to do more
activities than lower-type directors. Moreover, because a higher-type director
enjoys a higher marginal return to effort than does a lower-type director, a
higher-type director expends more effort than a lower-type director holding
constant the number of activities. In other words, busier directors are higher
types who would, thus, expend more effort per activity were they restricted
to the same number of activities as less-busy (lower-type) directors. This is a
countervailing effect vis-a`-vis the less-effort-the-more-activities effect identified
in the previous paragraph. Which of the two effects dominates is, a priori,
indeterminate. Theory, therefore, does not offer a definitive prediction about
the effort of busy directors once one recognizes that the number of board seats
held is endogenous.
To illustrate why this is an important fact to recognize, suppose that b(a) =
log(a) and c(x) = x2/2. Straightforward calculations reveal that a∗ =
√
θ/M .
Expression (6) is readily shown to equal
θM log
(√
θ
M
)
− θ
2M
, (7)
which is a globally concave function of M for any θ. Suppose there are just
two types, 9 and 15. Table 1 demonstrates that the optimal number of activi-
ties (directorships) is 4 for the 9-type and 6 for the 15-type director. Because√
15/6 >
√
9/4, it follows that the directors who are busier in equilibrium (the
15-type) expend more effort on each of their directorships than do the less-busy
directors (the 9-type) on each of theirs. In other words, busier does not equate
to less effort in this example.
4.2.2 Empirical Work on Busy Directors
Given that theory is ambiguous in its prediction of the overall effect of busy
directors on firms, people have attempted to discern empirically which of the
two effects dominates. In other words, is the fact that busy directors are likely
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Table 1: Utility for different director types according to number of directorships
taken. Numbers are calculated according to the example connected to
expression (7) in the text.
Utility for Type
Directorships θ = 9 θ = 15
3 13.33 33.71
4 13.47 37.78
5 12.33 39.70
6 10.20 39.98
7 7.27 38.94
to be relatively high quality directors more important than the impact of their
potential lack of time on their effectiveness? Consistent with the quality ar-
guments, Kaplan and Reishus (1990), Booth and Deli (1996), and Ferris et al.
(2003) find that there is a positive relationship between a firm’s performance
and the additional directorships acquired by its board members: when the firm
cuts its dividend its directors lose directorships (Kaplan and Reishus); when a
firm performs well, its directors are more likely to land seats on other boards
(Ferris et al.). Ferris et al. also find that “busy” directors are equally likely to
serve on committees as other directors and are no more likely to be sued than
other directors, which these authors interpret as supporting the view that busy
directors do not shirk on their responsibilities.
However, not being sued and agreeing to serve on committees seem like rel-
atively indirect tests of the hypothesis that being busy hurts performance. Fich
and Shivdasani (2006) provide more direct tests of this hypothesis. Fich and
Shivdasani find that firms with a majority of directors who serve on three or
more boards have lower market-to-book ratios than other firms. In addition,
ceo turnover is less sensitive to performance in such firms compared to others.
Stock prices increase when busy directors depart a board. Conversely, the stock
price of the firms on whose boards they already sit declines when busy direc-
tors add an additional board seat. Overall, these findings suggest having busy
directors on a board can fail to be in the firm’s interests.40
The above contributions not withstanding, more research is still necessary
to fully understand the impact of busy directors. Most empirical work relates
“busy” directors to aggregate firm outcomes. While it is possible that several
additional directorships of directors can hurt firm performance, it often seems
implausible that “busyness” should have an economically meaningful effect. In-
stead, busyness may simply be a proxy for some underlying governance problem.
For example, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) document that busy directors are
40Although, drawing from Khwaja et al. (2008), having a director who sits on many other
boards can improve a firm’s network and, hence, add value. It is possible that the importance
of this effect is greater in a developing country (such as the one studied by Khwaja et al.)
than in a developed country.
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more likely to be appointed to the board when the ceo has more influence over
the director-nominating process. Thus, the presence of many busy directors
could indicate a situation in which the ceo has too much power. In this case,
the finding that busy directors affect performance need not say anything about
the effort that busy directors exert. Perhaps the development of more direct
effort measures can aid in the understanding of busy directors. Adams and
Ferreira (2008) show that directors with more directorships are more likely to
have attendance problems at board meetings, which suggests that busy directors
spend less time at each firm. Busy directors could, though, still be of a higher
type, as we describe above, thus total effort exerted by busy directors could be
similar to that exerted by less busy directors.
4.3 Board Committees
Boards usually do most of their work in committees, and data on the committee
structure is generally publicly available. Some authors have used these data to
study the functioning of the board.
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) use information about the nominating com-
mittee to draw inferences over the ceo’s influence on the board. These authors
find that, when the ceo serves on the nominating committee or when there is
no such committee, fewer independent directors are appointed and the stock
price reaction to independent director appointments is lower than when there
is a nominating committee that does not include the ceo. This effect could be
causal, in that being on the nominating committee could allow ceos to exercise
control over board selection, or it could simply reflect that more powerful ceos
are both able to get appointed to nominating committees and also to influence
director selection. In either case, the Shivdasani and Yermack findings are con-
sistent with the view that powerful ceos are able to influence the structure of
their board.
Klein (1998) considers the relation between firm performance and board
committee structures. She finds that, although there is no relation between
overall board composition and firm performance, the number of insiders on the
finance and investment committees is positively associated with better perfor-
mance. The same causality question as discussed above is relevant for interpret-
ing her findings: Do insiders on the finance and investment committees cause
good performance or is this committee structure somehow a consequence of bet-
ter performance? In particular, if firms can improve performance substantially
simply by rearranging their committee structure, why haven’t all firms “opti-
mally” rearranged their committees? On the other hand, it is possible that firms
face external pressure to staff committees with outsiders, which leads them to
suboptimize by having too few insiders on key committees.
More recently, Adams (2003) and Hayes et al. (2004) have considered board
committee structure in more detail. Adams uses the committee structure of
boards as a way to infer the nature of the tasks to which boards spend their
time. She finds that boards of diversified firms devote more time to monitoring
while boards of growing firms devote more time to strategic issues. Hayes et
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al. find a number of results, most of which reflect the number of committees
and their tasks. The committees of larger firms and ones that pay dividends
tend to have more tasks assigned to them, while those in firms with higher ceo
ownership have fewer tasks. These findings suggest that the board is part of
the professionalization of the firm. As the firm becomes larger, more mature,
and transitions from founder management toward professional management, the
board plays a larger role in corporate governance.
Finally, a number of papers have used data on audit committee membership
to draw inferences about the accounting process inside of firms.41 This literature
looks at the quality of accounting, such as whether firms manipulate earnings
through accruals and whether a firms earnings response coefficient means that
earnings are informative about value. In general, these papers find that the
makeup of the audit committee is correlated with these variables of accounting
quality. Once again, it is difficult to infer causality from these studies. While it
is possible that audit committees play a role in improving accounting practice, it
is also possible that firms determined to improve their accounting change both
their accounting practices and their audit committee membership.
Committees are definitely an area where more work can be done. We still
lack a good understanding of the causes of variation in committee structure;
nor do we understand the relation between committees and the full board. One
reason for a lack of progress in understanding committees is that there is, as
yet, no readily available (“canned”) data set containing all committees.
5 What Motivates Directors?
Directors have a fiduciary duty to protect shareholders’ interests. Yet, their
interests are unlikely to be perfectly aligned with the shareholders’. Their in-
centives, therefore, have been a natural topic for research, which we survey here.
Given that the preceding discussion touches on these issues here and there and
we seek to avoid unnecessary repetition, this section will prove to be relatively
short.
5.1 Direct Compensation
Like all economic actors, directors may be presumed to prefer greater wealth
to less wealth; hence, they should be responsive to financial incentives. Indeed,
firms routinely use a variety of such incentives including additional fees for at-
tending meetings, stock and option grants, and performance bonuses. For a
sample of 1198 firms in 2002, Bryan and Klein (2004) report that the average
director received $102,976 in total annual compensation; of this, $71,839 was
incentive pay and $31,137 was cash. The latter figure also contains an incen-
tive component insofar as approximately $8129 are attendance-contingent fees.
41A partial list of this literature includes K. Anderson et al. (2003), R. Anderson et al.
(2004), Deli and Gillan (2000), Klein (2002), and Xie et al. (2003).
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Roughly 73% of firms in the sample made option grants and 37% stock grants.42
Yermack (2004) finds evidence that when all incentives are accounted for (in-
cluding keeping current board seats and gaining new ones), the average outside
director of a Fortune 500 firm gains 11 cents for each $1000 increase in firm
value. He finds that a one standard deviation change in the market capital-
ization of the median sample firm (a $2.6 billion change) results in a $285,000
change in an outside director’s wealth.
5.1.1 Theory
From a theoretical perspective, the basic ideas of incentive pay are well known
and have been analyzed at depth (see, e.g., Holmstrom, 1979, Shavell, 1979, and
Grossman and Hart, 1983; Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005, offers a textbook
treatment). The three-level hierarchy of shareholders-directors-management
generates some additional issues, such as possible collusion between directors
and management, but many of these have also been addressed in the broader
literature (see, e.g., Tirole, 1986, 1992).
An interesting board-specific theoretical analysis is Kumar and Sivaramakr-
ishnan (2008). First, unlike almost all the theoretical literature on boards, Ku-
mar and Sivaramakrishnan examine the role of the board in setting the ceo’s in-
centive compensation. Second, the authors explicitly study the role of incentive
pay for directors with respect to the performance of their duties. Among their
findings are that board independence and board incentive pay could be substi-
tutes; independent boards could be less diligent monitors than less-independent
boards; and, as a consequence, having a maximally independent board need not
be best for the shareholders ceteris paribus. The basic intuition is as follows.
A less-independent board, knowing it will not be as strong a negotiator against
the ceo when it comes time to set his compensation, has a stronger incentive
than does a more-independent board to learn payoff-relevant information prior
to those negotiations. The reason being that such information helps to offset
their weaker bargaining position. In essence, a less-independent board is play-
ing a “lash itself to the mast” strategy because it knows it won’t be able to
resist the ceo’s demands as well as it would otherwise like. Because a less-
independent board has a stronger incentive to gather information, the strength
of the compensation incentives it requires is less than would be required by a
more independent board. Hence, it is cheaper for the shareholders to employ
a less dependent board in terms of inducing the board to learn payoff-relevant
information. Of course, the fact that it is a more dependent board means the
shareholders bear other costs; but as Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan show, it is
possible for the former effect to be great enough to outweigh these other costs.
42See Brown (2007) for a survey of some of the, largely legal, issues connected to director
compensation.
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5.1.2 Empirical Work
There has been some empirical work on the determinants of director compen-
sation. Vafeas (1999) conducts a matched-sample analysis with a sample of
122 firms that adopted a director compensation scheme (a plan providing for
the grant of stock or options) between 1989 and 1995 and 122 that did not
(and had not). He finds that a strongly significant predictor of adoption is the
proportion of outside directors, which is positively related to adoption. Compar-
ing adopters and their matched non-adopters three years after plan adoption,
Vafeas finds adopters continue to have a higher proportion of outside direc-
tors. A comparison of differences between adopters and non-adopters, along
with suggestive, but not always statistically significant, regression coefficients,
indicate that firms that adopt tend to be larger (as measured by sales), are less
likely to have an unaffiliated blockholder, and have busier directors. Vafeas puts
forth the interpretation that adopting firms are more reliant on the board as a
monitoring device and, thus, contingent compensation is part of this governance
strategy.
Consistent with Vafeas, Bryan and Klein (2004) find evidence that firms with
greater agency problems make greater use of option compensation for outside
directors.43 In contrast to Vafeas, they find no evidence that the percentage of
outside directors is a significant predictor of option compensation. In relating
board independence to the structure of director compensation, it is important
to keep in mind that inside directors are not paid for their board service. Hence,
it may simply be too costly to introduce sophisticated compensation contracts
when there are few outside directors. As the number of outsiders grow, it may
be more reasonable to ask shareholders to approve director stock option and
share plans.
Like Bryan and Klein, Fich and Shivdasani (2005) find that firms with high
market-to-book ratios are more likely to utilize option compensation for their
directors than firms with low market-to-book ratios. They further find that,
consistent with an attenuation-of-agency-problems story, the stock market re-
acts favorably to the adoption of a director stock-option plan. Adoption led
to significant cumulative abnormal returns (0.31% for all adopters, 0.18% for a
subsample of “uncontaminated” events). Adoption also led to an improvement
in the earnings-per-share forecast.
On the other hand, it is possible that, instead of being a solution to an
agency problem, director compensation plans are evidence of an unresolved
43The authors use measures of investment opportunities (either r&d expenses or market-to-
book ratio) as an agency variable; the idea being that having more potentially squanderable
investment opportunities means the agency problem is worse. Other agency variables are
leverage and being regulated; the disciplining nature of debt or outside regulation reduces
agency problems. More controversial is a measure of closeness to financial distress; the au-
thors argue that distress leads to greater creditor control, which reduces the agency problem.
Alternatively, the higher likelihood that the stock will be worthless reduces the value of stock
options, making them a less-powerful incentive for directors. Or, as another alternative, the
creditors, worried about the asset-substitution problem, want to avoid giving directors incen-
tives to gamble.
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agency problem. Brick et al. (2006) find a strong positive correlation between
excess ceo compensation and excess director compensation, where excess com-
pensation is defined as the residual from a pay-for-performance regression. If
the regression residuals were truly random errors, then they should be uncor-
related. Correlation indicates systematic factors within each firm. Brick et al.
suggest that one such systematic factor could be “cronyism” between the direc-
tors and the ceo; that is, the directors and ceo collude together against the
shareholders to improperly increase their compensation.
Other authors (Perry, 1999, and Adams and Ferreira, 2008) have sought to
determine whether incentive pay for directors has an effect on their actions.
Adams and Ferreira (2008) estimate the effect of meeting-attendance fees on
directors’ decisions to attend board meetings. These authors find, somewhat
surprisingly given the high opportunity cost of most directors’ time, that receiv-
ing as little as $1000 per meeting significantly increases attendance. Consistent
with the view that incentive pay improves performance, Perry finds that incen-
tive pay makes outsider-dominated boards even more likely to dismiss the ceo
for poor financial performance.
An important consideration when evaluating studies of director compensa-
tion is that both directors’ compensation and their actions could be a function of
some third factor. For example, one possible source of variation in governance is
between professionally managed and family firms. It is likely that professionally
managed firms are more likely to hire compensation consultants when design-
ing director compensation systems, and consequently are more likely to include
incentive-based plans, and are also likely to have higher levels of compensation
(given directors must be hired via arms-length transactions). Such an expla-
nation is often difficult to rule out—although Adams and Ferreira (2008) are
largely able to do so by using both director fixed effects and directorship effects
(which control for family versus non-family firms) and instrumental variables to
address endogeneity problems. It is also likely that these professionally managed
firms have higher market-to-book ratios, higher attendance at board meetings,
and more performance-based evaluation of the ceo. The professionalism of the
management team is only one of many possible omitted variables. On the other
hand, there is no “smoking gun” to indicate that one or more omitted factors
are the explanation for the results of these studies (and, as noted, Adams and
Ferreira, 2008 is very careful). Nevertheless, as we have emphasized, omitted
variables are always a worrisome possibility when interpreting these (and other)
findings.
5.2 Reputational Concerns
What other motivations, besides direct compensation, could affect director be-
havior? A possible motive that has been heavily investigated is the concern that
directors have for being seen as able business people. An idea, dating back at
least to Fama (1980), is that concern for his reputation will cause an agent to act
more in his principal’s interests than standard approaches to agency might sug-
gest. On the other hand, as Holmstrom (1999) observes, reputational concerns
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are not sufficient to eliminate agency problems and they can, in fact, create
additional ones. With respect to the latter, reputational concerns can generate
agency problems with respect to the agent’s choice of risky projects.44
Directors’ reputations are likely to be important in the market for direc-
torships. A strong reputation presumably aids in getting more board seats or
retaining the ones already held, a weak reputation the opposite. Gilson (1990)
and Kaplan and Reishus (1990) examine this possibility empirically.45 These
articles find that poorly performing ceos are less likely to gain board seats
on other companies than well-performing ceos (with poor performance being
indicated by financial distress or a reduction in dividends, respectively, in the
two studies). Fich (2005) studies the stock-price reaction to adding directors
of different qualities. Most noticeably, he finds that the cumulative abnormal
return in response to the addition of a director who is ceo of another firm is
significantly greater the higher the industry-adjusted roa of his firm is. The
new director’s holding an mba also has a positive impact on the cumulative
abnormal return, albeit at a marginal level of significance. A sobering finding
about our own reputations is that adding academics to a board is associated
with a negative return, although the effect is not statistically significant.
Fich and Shivdasani (2007) examine the effect on directors’ reputations if
they sit on the boards of firms that are the subject of shareholder class-action
lawsuits alleging financial fraud. They find that outside directors are no more
likely to leave the board of the sued firm than they would be otherwise. These
directors do, however, see a significant drop in other board seats held. The size of
this drop is greater the more severe the fraud allegations (there is an associated
formal action by the sec) and when they arguably bear greater responsibility for
monitoring fraud (they serve on the audit committee). Finally, these “tainted”
directors are more likely to lose directorships at firms with arguably stronger
corporate governance (as measured by the Gompers et al., 2003, index) and
their departure is associated with positive cumulative abnormal returns for these
firms.
Although such studies are valuable, it is worth observing that they touch
only on measures of reputation visible to the econometrician; they don’t nec-
essarily pick up on “soft” dimensions of reputation. In particular, a director
who wishes to maintain or obtain board seats could, at least in theory, face a
reputational tradeoff. As the studies above indicate, a director who develops a
public reputation as a poor monitor is hurt with respect to the number of board
seats he or she holds. At the same time, however, a director who develops a
private reputation as a poor monitor—that is, as someone unlikely to rock the
44In Holmstrom (1999), reputational concerns cause the agent to shy away from risky
projects. As, however, others have noted, that conclusion depends on whether outside ob-
servers know the risk of the project taken. If they do, then an agent could rationally be overly
risk loving when choosing projects. The reason is that observers will not update their beliefs
about the agent’s abilities much in response to a risky project’s outcome, because it is a noisy
signal; consequently, the risk to the agent’s reputation is lower than if he undertook a less
risky and, hence, more informative project. See, e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (2008) for a
more complete discussion of this issue in a governance context.
45Another article in this area is Yermack (2004).
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boat—might be favored by ceos who are looking to acquire power at the ex-
pense of the board. Certainly, a number of the models discussed in Section 2.2
rely on there being observable (to the ceo at least) differences across directors
in the intensity with which they carry out their monitoring roles.
A model that partially gets at this dual tension is Warther (1998). In his
model, there is a three-person board consisting of two outside directors and the
ceo. The outside directors care about their public reputation, so wish to remove
a poorly performing ceo. The ceo, of course, never votes for his own removal,
so any removal requires unanimity between the outside directors. A problem in
achieving unanimity is that the two outside directors receive private signals of
the ceo’s ability that are, conditional on his ability, independently distributed.
The outside directors can share information, but only in a costly manner: an
outside director who indicates she has a negative signal of the ceo’s ability will
be punished for her disloyalty to the ceo by losing her board seat if she fails
to oust him. Consequently, both directors can receive moderately bad signals
about the ceo, such that it would be optimal to oust him, but neither speaks
up for fear of losing her seat. If, however, a director’s signal is bad enough, then
(i) her concern for her public reputation will be more severe and (ii) the more
likely it is that her co-outside director has also received a bad signal; hence, in
this case, she speaks out against the ceo. The overall result is that only truly
awful ceos get fired, with too high a proportion of weak ceos’ getting to keep
their jobs.
As formulated, there are two points of concern with the Warther model.
First, why has the ceo been granted the power to determine who remains on the
board? If the ceo can’t retaliate against a boat-rocker, the problem disappears.
Second, why don’t the outside directors share their evidence privately from
the ceo and coo¨rdinate their subsequent actions? In the Warther model, the
directors, having shared information, will agree as to the ceo’s ability and will,
thus, agree about whether he should go or stay; hence, the ceo’s power to rid
himself of a trouble-making director is no longer relevant. As noted previously,
granting the ceo an ability to influence board membership is consistent with
field studies (e.g., Mace, 1971), but this doesn’t explain why he has that power.
It is possible that integrating Warther’s model into a bargaining-type model of
board determination (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998) could rationalize the
ceo’s ability to retaliate against dissenting directors. The second issue might
also be finessed by a suitable change in the model. Suppose the directors, for
some reason, do not agree what the standard for dismissal should be. The more
hard-nosed director could be reluctant to approach the more lenient director for
fear (i) they would reach different conclusions and (ii) the more lenient director
might rat her out to the ceo (perhaps to curry favor with the ceo, to avoid
future problems with a dissident director, or to promote a private reputation
among ceos as a director who doesn’t rock the boat).
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6 Conclusions
Corporate governance, and in particular the role of boards of directors, has been
the topic of much attention lately. Although this attention is particularly topical
due to well-publicized governance failures and subsequent regulatory changes,
corporate governance is an area of longstanding interest in economics (dating
back to at least Adam Smith, 1776).46 Because of corporations’ enormous share
of economic activity in modern economies, the cost of their agency problems
is extremely important. Consequently, corporate governance and the role of
boards of directors are issues of fundamental importance in economics. Un-
derstanding the role of boards is vital both for our understanding of corporate
behavior and with respect to setting policy to regulate corporate activities.
Given the fundamental importance of the issue and its prominent place in
the public eye, it is not surprising that there has been a surge of research on
boards of directors; indeed, perhaps the surprising fact is that it has taken so
long for boards to become such an active topic of research. We survey this
literature here, paying special attention to that done by the economics and
finance professions, and also to that research done subsequent to the Hermalin
andWeisbach (2003) survey. Unavoidably there is much work we have neglected;
one of the difficult aspects of writing this survey is that there are new papers
appearing nearly every day, outstripping our capacity to write about them!47
Boards of directors are difficult institutions to study. The two questions most
asked about boards concern what determines their makeup, and what deter-
mines their actions. These questions are, however, fundamentally intertwined—
the makeup of boards is interesting because it affects what the board does; and,
consequently, their makeup is influenced by a desire to affect what they do.
This problem of joint endogeneity is vexing for both theoretical and empirical
research on boards; research that focuses on one side of the equation while ignor-
ing the other is necessarily incomplete and the results misleading. Nevertheless,
progress has been made, much of it in the last five or six years.
Empirical study of boards is difficult for a number of reasons. First, one must
deal with broader than ideal classifications of directors. An outside director, for
instance, gets coded as such whether she is truly independent or she’s the ceo’s
oldest friend.48 Second, nearly all variables of interest are, as discussed, jointly
46With respect to directors, Smith wrote “The directors of such companies, however, being
the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that
they should watch over it with . . . anxious vigilance . . . Negligence and profusion, therefore,
must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such compan[ies]”
(Book v, Part iii, Article i, “Of the Publick Works and Institutions which are necessary for
facilitating particular Branches of Commerce,” paragraph 18).
47A possible reason for the growth in the literature is better data availability. A number of
new databases on boards have become available and have been used in a number of studies.
A database provided by Compact Disclosure has a long time series, running from 1988 to the
present, while an alternative database provided by irrc has detailed information on committee
structure and the professional background of directors. Both databases are used and described
in Fahlenbrach (in press).
48Hwang and Kim (in press) and Cohen et al. (2008) are two recent attempts to estimate
which outside directors are truly independent.
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endogenous. Unlike the situation in some other areas of economics, there are
no cure-all instruments that one can use to deal with this endogeneity. Ulti-
mately, much of what one learns about boards is about equilibrium associations.
Causality, in the usual sense, is often impossible to determine. For example, con-
sider Weisbach’s (1988) findings that outside directors appear more responsive
to performance in the ceo retention decision than inside directors. Because the
directors in question were determined through some equilibrium (albeit, possi-
bly, second-best) selection process, one does not have a classic experiment in
which different director types are randomly assigned to control and treatment
pools. Whether random allocations of directors would yield similar findings
is unknowable and, thus, one cannot be sure that the findings, although both
sensible and suggestive, are not driven by some unseen third force that deter-
mines the proportion of outsiders on the board, the performance of the ceo,
and proclivities of the former to fire the latter.
Ultimately, many of the strongest empirical regularities that have been found
can best be interpreted as statements about both the director-selection process
and their direct effect on board actions. For example, staggered boards tend
to base ceo-retention decisions less on their ceo’s performance than do non-
staggered boards. Why? Perhaps because, as the consequence of past good
performance, the ceo gains bargaining power, which he uses to protect himself.
Thus, for instance, he arranges for his board to become staggered; but increasing
his power in this way comes at the cost of a reduced ability to discipline him in
the future should circumstances warrant. Hence, in the longer run, firms with
staggered boards will have lower valuations than do firms with non-staggered
boards. A similar story can be told for any decrease in board power, such as
the creation of interlocked boards.
Other empirical results can be interpreted sensibly by considering both the
selection and actions of boards. For example, there are a number of studies that
look at the actions of outside directors that tend to find that boards dominated
by outsiders tend to be more shareholder-friendly than boards dominated by
insiders.49 Yet, studies that have examined the overall performance of firms
with different kinds of boards have all found little or no difference in overall
performance.50 These ostensibly conflicting results make sense when both the
selection and action issues are considered. Outside directors are probably better
from a shareholder perspective, but because they tend to be added following
poor performance (see, e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988) or most demonstrate
their value in crisis situations, the relation between outsider directors and firm
value is obscured.
Theory, too, faces its hurdles. Boards are only part of the corporate gover-
nance equation, but an all-inclusive model is impractical given the complexities
of governance. Even limiting attention to boards, it is hard to decide which
institutions should be treated as exogenous and which as endogenous. Letting
too much be endogenous and the models become unwieldy and often fail to yield
49See, for example, Weisbach (1988), Shivdasani (1993), and Brickley et al. (1994).
50See, for example, MacAvoy et al. (1983), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), or Bhagat and
Black (1999).
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definitive results. Treating too much as exogenous and critical points of joint
endogeneity get overlooked, rendering conclusions that are suspect.
Despite these issues, valuable insights have been gleaned. Models linking the
determinants of the board and its monitoring function have proved reasonably
robust and broadly consistent with subsequent empirical analyses. There has
also been progress on models that examine the board’s role in setting strategy,
although their conclusions are difficult to test empirically and these models have
not always been as sensitive to joint-endogeneity issues as would be ideal.
Where do we see research on boards headed? The open questions are many
and often fundamental. For instance, are the various means of governing a
corporation complements or substitutes? That is, do firms tend to be strong-
governance firms across all the various dimensions of incentive compensation,
openness to takeovers, and board independence?51 Or does strength in one area
correspond to weakness in another? At a theoretical level, this question is almost
surely impossible to answer, but one can hope to see progress on the empirical
side. Even understanding whether governance mechanisms are complements or
substitutes, one is left to ponder the sources of heterogeneity in governance that
we observe; how is such heterogeneity best explained? Although there has been
some work in this area (consider, e.g., Hermalin, 1994, as an early attempt),
there are still many open questions. Other promising areas for theory are how
the board fits into the ceo succession process; the role of the complexity of a
firm’s operations and environment on the choice of directors and their actions
(we sketched possible paths to explore above); more dynamic models of board
evolution and the long-term path of governance; modeling board interactions
(Warther, 1998, representing one line of approach); and what benefit, other than
protecting the ceo, insiders on a board might play.
Empirical work will need to continue to devise ways of dealing with the
joint-endogeneity issue. A possible strategy in this regard is to look for “nat-
ural experiments.” One set of such experiments are changes in regulation. In
particular, if a new regulation is put in place, it is possible that some firms
are already in compliance with it, while others are not. If bargaining models
of governance (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998) are correct, then we should
see little to no change in ceo compensation for those firms that were already
in compliance, while ceo compensation should, in the long term, rise for those
firms that must come into compliance. If firms set their governance structure
optimally given their constraints, then the long-run performance of those firms
for which the new regulations bind should be worse than that of those already
in compliance. In the short run, however, the results could be more confused,
to the extent that the regulation holds up the ceo for the shareholders’ benefit;
that is, to the extent that the ceo bargained for something that benefitted him
at shareholder expense, but had that bargain subsequently undone by the reg-
ulation, there would be short-term gain by shareholders (this is why it may be
more relevant to consider ceo compensation than firm value). Chhaochharia
and Grinstein (2009) follow this approach with respect to changes in the nyse
51Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994) can be seen as an early contribution to this question.
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and Nasdaq board requirements made in the wake of the Enron and Worldcom
scandals. They find evidence consistent with the predictions for the short-run
effects: those firms that were out of compliance with the regulations at the time
of the regulations saw a fall in ceo compensation. There is also some, albeit
weak, evidence in favor of the long-term view that binding constraints can push
up ceo compensation: After the immediate shock, ceo compensation began
to rise over time (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, Table I, Panel C). It would be
interesting to know whether, when a longer panel is examined, if those firms
that were out of compliance at the time the regulations were put in place had
the faster growth in ceo compensation after the immediate shock than those
that had been in compliance.
Additional topics that strike us as profitable areas of future research are:
1. How are potential outside directors identified?52 What is the role of search
firms in this process? What is the role of social networks in this process?53
Moreover, as noted above, there are different kinds of outside directors—
business people, former politicians, academics, and other prominent peo-
ple. Do firms in search of new directors first identify the kind they seek,
then the individual or do they compare a range of different kinds of in-
dividuals simultaneously? Do shareholders exercise any control of the
process?54
A related question is how are inside directors chosen. Are they, as some-
times claimed (see, e.g., Vancil, 1987), selected because they are potential
successors to the current ceo and service on the board allows the out-
side directors to assess their abilities?55 An alternative, but not mutually
exclusive, hypothesis is that having more management on the board facil-
itates better information flow, either to the ceo or from management to
the rest of the board.
2. As the previous topic alludes and as has been mentioned here and there
previously, how do social networks among directors fit into the equation? If
a corporation adds a director who sits on many boards, does it benefit from
the additional connections this brings? To what extent could such a benefit
outweigh the cost of having a busy director? Are such social networks
beneficial in some economies (e.g., developing economies, societies that
stress personal ties, etc.) and less beneficial in others? Economists have
begun to pay more attention to social networks (see e.g., Goyal, 2007,
52This question has received attention outside of economics; see, e.g., Westphal and Zajac
(1995). The relation between the identification of directors and their performance or how the
mechanics of director identification affect our models of board behavior have, however, not
received attention to the best of our knowledge.
53Westphal and Zajac (1995) provide a partial answer.
54Cai et al. (in press) examine the responsiveness of shareholders to director performance
when it comes to their reelection. They find that shareholders are responsive to some measures
of performance.
55Statistical findings in Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) are consistent with this view, but
cannot be seen as definitive.
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and Jackson, 2008) and the application of this analysis to boards seems a
logical extension.56
3. If, as some evidence reviewed above suggests, directors are a source of
expertise, then how and why does this expertise matter?57 After all, firms
can and do hire management consultants. Such consultants presumably
devote more hours to the firm than does an outside director and they have
an impressive amount of experience, research, and analytic capabilities
upon which to draw. Is the benefit of director expertise perhaps, then,
that the ceo cannot ignore them unlike consultants? (Of course, one could
have the consultants report to the board, making them harder to ignore.)
Alternatively, perhaps the expertise we are considering is the expertise to
be effective monitors; that is, the ability to detect the warning signs that
the ceo and other managers are not up to snuff or that they have not
thought through a proposed course of action with sufficient diligence. Yet
a further alternative is that the ceo is especially careful when it comes to
those dimensions on which a director’s expertise could cause her to block
what the ceo wishes to do. In this case, expertise only comes into play off
the equilibrium path; in equilibrium, the ceo never “triggers” a director’s
expertise.
4. There has been some work on the dynamics within boards. Typically,
the board is modeled as a single decision maker. Although such an ap-
proach could be justified by appeal to a median-voter model or certain
other preference-aggregation methods, it still leaves the actual workings
of the board a black box. Given survey evidence (Demb and Neubauer,
1992, p. 142) that American boards can be characterized as star (“hub-
and-spoke”) social networks, with the ceo at the hub, it is a non-trivial
question to understand how the directors coordinate to, for example, dis-
miss the ceo.58 Lorsch and MacIver (1989) provide evidence that it is
“taboo” for directors to consult each other behind the ceo’s back (p. 93);
yet, at the same time, they report survey results that indicate in a cri-
sis the average score on a three-point scale (1 = always, 2 = sometimes,
56As discussed supra, Khwaja et al. (2008) is one such exploration. Using Pakistani data,
they find evidence that the social network among directors benefits the firms on which they
sit.
57There are, in fact, a number of issues concerning information flow in addition to expertise;
there is the risk, for instance, of herding or informational cascades. See, for instance, Slezak
and Khanna (2000).
58Westphal (1999) considers some issues related to this hub-and-spoke system. In particular,
he studies how board-ceo interactions affect firm performance, finding that firms that score
better on measures of “advice and counsel interactions” and “board monitoring” have statis-
tically significant greater return on equity than those firms that score worse. Westphal argues
that his findings suggest that stronger social ties in the ceo-director relationship enhances
board involvement, to the benefit of the firm. Schmidt (2008) provides further evidence; an
interpretation of his analysis is that social ties are beneficial when monitoring less important
and detrimental when monitoring is important. Adams and Ferreira (in press) can be seen
as further evidence that looser social ties are beneficial when monitoring is important (e.g.,
when a decision must be made to retain or fire the ceo).
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3 = never) for the question of contacting other directors privately about
financial performance data is 1.6 (p. 100), suggesting this taboo can be
broken. On the other hand, on the same three-point scale, the mean score
on “confronting ceo at board meeting about depressed market value of
shares” is 1.98 and on privately contacting other directors about the same
matter the mean is 2.21. The 1.98 measure is also consistent with survey
evidence that 51% of directors feel inhibited about speaking out in board
meetings (p. 83). A robust understanding of the role of directors requires
a better understanding of just what goes on in the boardroom.
5. Although there has been a growing literature looking at the role of board
committees (see discussion supra), the role of committees generally and
their relation to the overall board specifically are not fully understood.
The same dynamics questions asked about the board as a whole apply
equally to committees. Furthermore, how do the committees relate to
overall board behavior. For instance, recent reforms have dictated that
firms have some committees (audit, compensation) comprised entirely of
outside directors. Does providing some outside directors an opportunity
to talk outside of management’s hearing affect the overall board’s behavior
when it comes to issues such as approving large capital projects or decid-
ing whether to dismiss the ceo? Do these committees change the board
from being a hub-and-spoke social network to being an interlinked-star
social network? Does serving on committees increase outside directors’
understanding and knowledge of the firm, making them better monitors
or simply more meddlesome? There may also be opportunities for intellec-
tual arbitrage here, as the relation between legislative committees and the
overall legislature is an issue that has been studied in political science.59
6. The vast majority of the literature focuses on Anglo-American firms. Stud-
ies of boards in non-Anglo-American firms and comparisons of boards
across countries is, in contrast, an understudied area. It is not, to be sure,
an empty area—space considerations led us not to survey this area—but
is, arguably, under explored. Numerous questions exist: does, for instance,
board independence matter more in countries with weak shareholder pro-
tection than in countries with strong shareholder protection? How do dif-
ferent board arrangements (e.g., dual boards as in much of Europe versus
the unitary boards of the us) correlate with other aspects of governance
(e.g., compensation, executive turnover, takeovers, etc.) or with firm be-
havior (profitability, merger activity, relations with suppliers, etc.)? In
particular, one could use differences in the laws governing boards as “nat-
ural experiments” to help test various hypotheses. For instance, if theory
indicates more of factor x should lead to more of y, do we see firms in
nations that require greater x having more y or not?
A related issue, which also harkens back to how are directors chosen,
59Examples of this literature include Shepsle (1979) and Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989, 1990).
The authors thank Ernesto Dal Bo´ for guidance on this literature.
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is whether firms benefit from having foreign directors on their boards,
particularly in situations in which they are considering acquisition of a
foreign firm, seeking to expand in foreign markets, or have important
suppliers overseas.
7. There are undoubtedly links between boards and the growing field of be-
havioral corporate finance (see, e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005). Direc-
tors could, for instance, suffer the well-known cognitive bias of putting
too much weight on their initial impression of the ceo and not updating
quickly enough on the basis of new information. Conversely, they could
be subject to the attribution biases and, for example, assign too much re-
sponsibility for outcomes to the ceo and not enough on the circumstances
that affected these outcomes. Indeed, if they are favorably disposed to the
ceo, research suggests that directors would then attribute good outcomes
to the ceo and bad outcomes to circumstances (see, e.g., Plous, 1993, es-
pecially chapter 16); if unfavorably disposed, then the opposite bias would
exist. In this light, it is interesting to speculate about the extent to which
the “cult of the ceo” that has emerged in the last twenty years helps
explain the rise in ceo turnovers (Huson et al., 2001, and Kaplan and
Minton, 2006): As people become more convinced about the centrality of
the ceo to a firm’s success or failure, do directors come to over attribute
bad outcomes to the ceo and under attribute them to circumstances?
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